Picture-perfect is not perfect for metamemory: Testing the perceptual fluency hypothesis with degraded images.

Abstract

The perceptual fluency hypothesis claims that items that are easy to perceive at encoding induce an illusion that they will be easier to remember, despite the finding that perception does not generally affect recall. The current set of studies tested the predictions of the perceptual fluency hypothesis with a picture generation manipulation. Participants identified mixed lists of intact images and images whose certain parts were deleted (generate condition) and made predictions about their subsequent memory performance, followed by a recall test. The intact condition always produced higher memory predictions and shorter identification latencies than the generate condition, consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis (Experiments 1 to 3). The actual memory performance for generate images was higher than intact images when aggregate judgments of learning (JOLs) were used (Experiment 1) and equivalent to intact images when item-by-item JOLs were used (Experiment 2 to 3). In Experiment 3, introducing a manipulation that facilitates naming latency for generate images did not increase JOL ratings, providing evidence that not all manipulations that facilitate the ease of perception produce higher JOLs. In Experiment 4, the role of a priori beliefs for the picture generation manipulation was assessed through an online questionnaire. Reading a scenario about the manipulation produced no JOL differences for intact and generate images. The results of the 4 experiments reported here are generally consistent with the perceptual fluency hypothesis of metamemory, and are discussed in terms of experience-based and theory-based processes in metamemory judgments and Koriat's (1997) cue utilization framework. (PsycINFO Database Record

Generating lies produces lower memory predictions and higher memory performance than telling the truth: Evidence for a metacognitive illusion.

“…Experiment 4 provides more evidence for theory-based processes, as participants produced higher JOLs for truth than for lies, despite the lack of objective response latency differences. Third, participants can be directly asked about their beliefs through questionnaires without being exposed to the experimental materials (Besken, 2016;Koriat et al, 2004;Kornell et al, 2011;Mueller et al, 2014;Susser et al, 2016), make JOLs before they are exposed to the specific episode on an item-by-item basis (Mueller et al, 2014(Mueller et al, , 2016, or make global estimations about the predicted memory performance before the experiment begins (Frank & Kuhlmann, 2016). Experiment 5 showed the contribution of a priori beliefs to JOLs through the presentation of a scenario, in which participants had to predict their memory performance without exposure to the experiment, revealing higher memory predictions for truth trials than lie trials.…”

“…Perhaps, this finding can be explained by a priori beliefs about the effects of the lie-generation manipulation. Thus, Experiment 5 applied a straightforward, widely used method (Besken, 2016;Koriat et al, 2004;Kornell et al, 2011;Mueller et al, 2014;Susser et al, 2016) to measure the effects of a priori beliefs on memory predictions. Specifically, participants who have not been exposed to the study materials are asked to read a memory experiment scenario and make predictions about the effect of the lie-generation manipulation.…”

Processing Fluency in Education: How Metacognitive Feelings Shape Learning, Belief Formation, and Affect

“…From this evidence, a more general conclusion can be drawn: JOLs should be the more accurate predictors of future recall the more fluency (as the experiential basis for JOLs) is based on the processes relevant for retrieval. In contrast, JOLs are poor predictors when fluency is at odds with the probability of recall (for supporting evidence, e.g., Besken, 2016;Besken & Mulligan, 2013).…”

If it is easy to remember, then it is not secure: Metacognitive beliefs affect password selection

“…Our research did not measure fluency and thus cannot completely rule out this explanation. However, there is clear evidence that encoding fluency affects perceived memorability (Besken, ; Undorf & Erdfelder, , ). Thus, it would be more consistent with the current knowledge on metacognition if fluency affected perceived memorability, which in turn affected perceived security, which in turn affected password selection, effectively adding another link to the causal chain.…”

“…For example, the debate about how metacognitive judgments are made may be relevant. Currently, the perspective is that they are based on experience‐driven factors, theory‐driven factors, or both (Besken, ; Blake & Castel, ; Jemstedt, Schwartz, & Jönsson, ; Undorf & Zimdahl, ; Yan, Bjork, & Bjork, ). Experience‐driven factors come from direct experience with the items, for example, feelings of fluency during encoding.…”