Pictures, presence and visibility

Aasen, Solveig

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0475-4

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…However, the first set is much richer than the second (Briscoe 2016; Ferretti 2016a, 2016c, 2017a; see also below). And the most evident and crucial different property within this second set is the property of being present 2 —this does not conflict with the idea of pictorial presence that ‘one visually perceives something present in the realm of the picture when experiencing a picture as a depiction’ (Aasen 2015: 188). The possibility of this kind of property attribution distinguishes these two perceptual processes.…”

Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 96%

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Ferretti¹

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:Are face-to-face perception and picture perception different perceptual phenomena? The question is controversial. On the one hand, philosophers have offered several solid arguments showing that, despite some resemblances, they are quite different perceptual phenomena and that pictures are special objects of perception. On the other hand, neuroscientists routinely use pictures in experimental settings as substitutes for normal objects, and this practice is successful in explaining how the human visual system works. But this seems to imply that face-to-face perception and picture perception are very similar, if not actually the same. How can we decide between these two opposite intuitions? Here I offer a regimentation of the notion of picture perception that can reconcile these two apparently conflicting ideas about pictures. It follows that philosophers and neuroscientists can maintain their respective stances without any theoretical conflict.

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Section: The Sharpened Weak Neuroscientific Thesismentioning

confidence: 96%

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Ferretti¹

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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“…It is also not clear what the claim that they exist adds (not to mention the claim that they really exist). Perhaps part of what he has in mind is that real likenesses have, as Aasen (2015) has argued, a presence, which justifies saying that we see them, and not merely that we have a visual experience of them. When he talks of looking into the eyes of persons seen in the paintings (e.g., p. 47), he might be thinking that these persons are present to be seen.…”

Section: The Real Likeness Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Wiesing (2009) thinks we see an 'image object' that is 'artificially present' in pictures. Aasen (2015; thinks we see an indeterminate and general entity present in 'pictorial space'. And, in the case of photographs, Martin (2012) thinks we see an appearance not exemplified by the photography's surface.…”

Section: The Real Likeness Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Real Likenesses. Representation in Paintings, Photographs and Novels, by Michael Morris

Aasen

2021

Mind

Self Cite

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The view developed in this book is that when looking at a representational painting we see a 'real likeness': something that is worked in paint, that really exists, that resembles what is depicted, and that, in virtue of that resemblance, counts as the same kind of thing as what is depicted. This Real Likeness view is applied not only to representation in painting, but also representation in photography and in novels. For each of these three art forms, the Real Likeness view is presented as the best solution to a problem. A constraint on any plausible solution to that problem is 'the Non-Distraction Thesis':(ND) Attending to the medium of a representational work cannot inevitably be a distraction from attending to its content, or vice versa. (P. 21.)In this review, I present and discuss the problem, (ND) and the real likeness view in three consecutive sections. My focus will be Morris's discussion of paintings, which constitutes the first part of the book and which is used when applying the view to photography and novels.Morris makes an interesting and significant contribution with his book, I think. However, presenting his view as standing alone in opposition to the 'dominant' views of depiction, photography and literary fiction is, in my opinion, to exaggerate its novelty. The view has some (albeit perhaps not 'dominant') siblings in the literature on depiction and photography, where Aasen (2015), Briscoe (2016), Martin (2012), Nanay (2018) and Wiesing (2009), like Morris, identify something which is seen in a picture or a photograph, is additional to it and what it represents, and plays a vital representational role. Some issues in the philosophy of perception, attention and language, are also clearly relevant but not engaged with. While I mainly have to bypass these issues, I will towards the end of this review compare Morris's view to its siblings in the depiction literature and try to identify something that I believe stands out about it.

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“…For all these reasons, the ordinary object view is not particularly promising when it comes to the sensory individuals of picture perception (see also Wollheim 1987, pp. 67-71, Zeimbekis, 2010and Aasen, 2016 for related arguments). One may object that my assumption that ordinary objects are to be understood as particulars was not justified.…”

Section: Ordinary Objectsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A similar move could be and has been made when it comes to the sensory individuals of picture perception. Given that the view that properties are attributed to particulars in picture perception is not too promising, we could settle for the view that properties are not attributed to anything in picture perception (Aasen, 2016 considers this option, which she calls the Platonian universals view and she prefers it to the instantiated universals view).…”

Section: Picture Perceptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception

Nánay

2022

Philos Stud

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When I am looking at an apple, I perceptually attribute certain properties to certain entities. Two questions arise: what are these entities (what is it that I perceptually represent as having properties) and what are these properties (what properties I perceive this entity as having)? This paper is about the former, less widely explored, question: what does our perceptual system attribute properties to? In other words, what are these ‘sensory individuals’. There have been important debates in philosophy of perception about what sensory individuals would be the most plausible candidates for which sense modalities. The aim of this paper is to ask a related question about picture perception: what is the sensory individual of picture perception? When we look at a picture and see an apple depicted in it, what kind of entity do we see? What do we perceptually attribute properties to? I argue that the most straightforward candidates (ordinary objects, sui generis sensory individuals, no sensory individuals) are all problematic and that the most plausible candidate for the sensory individuals of picture perception are spatiotemporal regions.

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Pictures, presence and visibility

Cited by 10 publications

References 15 publications

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?

Real Likenesses. Representation in Paintings, Photographs and Novels, by Michael Morris

What do we see in pictures? The sensory individuals of picture perception

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