Piecework versus merit pay: a mean field games approach to academic behavior

Abstract

This paper applies the mean Field game approach pioneered by Lasry and Lions (2007) to the analysis of the researchers' academic productivity. It provides a theoretical motivation for the stability of the universally observed Lotka's law. It shows that a remuneration scheme taking into account the researchers rank with respect to the academic resume can induce a larger number of researchers to overtake a minimal production standard. It thus appears as superior to piecework remuneration.

Paradigm Shift: A Mean Field Game Approach

“…Remunerations usually depend on the relative position of researchers among peers and should not necessarily be increasing with : more realistic model should take into account this dimension (for instance, see Besancenot et al . () for a model in which rankings influence the researchers' remuneration). However, this cannot be taken into account in this model where all present the same instantaneous academic production.…”