“…We certainly accept the constraints imposed by the ERM2, namely the requirements of: (1) applying this mechanism for at least two years prior to the examination period qualifying for the euro zone, (2) maintaining currency stability within a 'normal' band of fluctuations and (3) refraining from currency devaluation in any form. We agree with a widely accepted opinion that participation in ERM2 should not exceed the arbitrarily imposed minimum two-year period, sharing the views of Szapáry (2000), Kennen and Meade (2003), and Kočenda, Kutan and Yigit (2005), among others. In hindsight, while the ERM2 necessitates the pursuit of exchange rate stability objective, we view the possibility of incorporating it into DIT framework as a preferred policy option, which will preserve policy autonomy to the very end of the euro-convergence process.…”