Pirates, privateers and the political economy of private violence

Abstract

Historical accounts of private violence in international relations are often rather undertheorised and under-contextualised. Overall, private violence historically needs to be seen in the context of the relationship between state-building, political economy and violence, rather than through the narrative of states gradually monopolising violence. Pirates and privateers in late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century Europe were embedded in a broader political economy of violence which needed and actively promoted 'private' violence in a broader pursuit of power. As such, the de-legitimatisation of piracy and privateering were the consequence of a number of interlinked political economic trends, such as the development of public protection of merchant shipping (through the growth of centralised navies), the move away from trade monopolies to inter-imperial trade, and the development of capitalism and industrialism. Present forms of private violence also need to be seen as part of a broader historical dynamic of war, violence and political economy.Historical accounts of private violence in international relations are often rather undertheorised and under-contextualised. A re-examination of the era of European state-building in terms of the relationship between states and private forms of violence can produce important insights about the role and context of private violence in history. Overall, private violence should be seen in the context of the broader relationship between state-building, political economy and violence, rather than through the narrative of states gradually monopolising violence. Otherwise it is all too easy to overdraw lessons from the past. Early modern forms of private violence were linked especially to two factors: the mercantilist global economy and the process of state-building. As processes of state-building, war making, and the pursuit of commerce continued, the eventual consolidation of strong states in Western Europe, with 1 Thanks to Alex Colas, Douglas Bulloch, Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira and the three anonymous referees for their comments on the original paper, which greatly influenced its current form.

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