Planning for the worst: risk, uncertainty and the Olympic Games

Abstract

Security for the Olympic Games has become undeniably visible in recent years. A certain degree of this visibility became unavoidable after the 1972 Munich Olympics when military personnel and hardware became standard elements of Olympic security. Yet, this visibility is qualitatively different today in that it is often deliberately fashioned for public consumption. This article argues that this expressive dimension of security at the Games provides a window into wider issues of how authorities 'show' that they can deliver on the promise of maximum security under conditions of radical uncertainty. The latter sections of this article examine three ways in which this promise is extended: the discursive work of managers of unease, the staging of highly stylized demonstration projects, and the fabrication of fantasy documents. We focus on how officials emphasize that they have contemplated and planned for all possible security threats, especially catastrophic threats and worst-case scenarios. Actually planning for these events is epistemologically and practically impossible, but saying and showing that authorities are 'planning for the worst' are discursive ways of transforming uncertainty into apparently manageable risks that are independent of the functional activities they describe. As such, our analysis provides insights into the much broader issue of how authorities sustain the appearance of maximum security in order to maintain rhetorical control over what are deemed to be highly uncertain and insecure situations. Such performances may paradoxically amplify uncertainty, thus recreating the conditions that foster the ongoing securitization of everyday life.

Iterations of Olympic security: Montreal and Vancouver

“…It is also significant that the most spectacular of these exercises are deliberately staged for public consumption, involving various degrees of stylization, finesse and production value (Boyle and Haggerty, 2012). As operationalized enactments of imagined catastrophes, these performances shape how we respond to risk, not only by teaching participants what roles they should play in managing crises, but also in contouring the broader selection of risks we prepare for in the present and conditioning the nature of such eventualities (Armstrong, 2012).…”

Supply management for major sport events: The case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games

“…However, supply management is an area that has been neglected, despite the fact that appropriate supply management in the OG can contribute substantially to the success of the event. Published articles deal only with guidelines on ways to improve supply effectiveness (Jago, Dwyer, Lipman, & Vorster, 2010) and discuss stakeholders in the supply process (Boyle & Haggerty, 2012;Jennings, 2012).…”

“…), which is often done through publicprivate partnerships (Fussey, Coaffee, Armstrong, & Hobbs, 2012). For that phase, one of the key challenges for the organizing committee is to consider the post-event period strategically-including for need forecasting and supplier selection (Boyle & Haggerty, 2012;Jennings, 2012)-and to establish contingency plans for the Games and Post-games period.…”

Justifying the civic interest in sport: Boltanski and Thévenot, the six worlds of justification, and hosting the Olympic games

“…In security, in the post-9/11 context, Olympic and other mega-event hosts must show maximal preparedness in being 'terrorist-ready' and able to 'plan for the worst' potential scenarios (cf. Boyle & Haggerty, 2012).…”