1995
DOI: 10.1080/09668139508412322
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Planning for war: The red army and the catastrophe of 1941

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Cited by 12 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Roberts has identified a comprehensive bias towards the offensive in Soviet military thinking, which emphasised counterattacks almost immediately after the onset of hostilities, proclaiming that not 'one inch' of Soviet territory would be taken by an aggressor. 32 Accordingly, when the Soviet leaders concerned themselves with the possible loss of important territories they were above all thinking about border areas such as Leningrad, Belorussia and Western Ukraine, and with somewhat less concern about Vladivostok and its environs. 33 It was simply never considered that an enemy could reach as far as the tank and tractor centre at Khar'kov in Eastern Ukraine, evacuated in mid-September 1941 and captured by the Nazis soon after.…”
Section: Mikhail Frunze Influential Bolshevik Military Theorist and mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Roberts has identified a comprehensive bias towards the offensive in Soviet military thinking, which emphasised counterattacks almost immediately after the onset of hostilities, proclaiming that not 'one inch' of Soviet territory would be taken by an aggressor. 32 Accordingly, when the Soviet leaders concerned themselves with the possible loss of important territories they were above all thinking about border areas such as Leningrad, Belorussia and Western Ukraine, and with somewhat less concern about Vladivostok and its environs. 33 It was simply never considered that an enemy could reach as far as the tank and tractor centre at Khar'kov in Eastern Ukraine, evacuated in mid-September 1941 and captured by the Nazis soon after.…”
Section: Mikhail Frunze Influential Bolshevik Military Theorist and mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…272 Soviet offensive airpower doctrine during the interwar period alternated between strategic bombing, with the fielding of a large force of four-engined bombers in the early 1930s, and ground support. 273 These four cases are interesting because, with access to roughly similar technology and exposure to similar bodies of airpower theory, each service implemented an offensive strategy with different characteristics. After World War II, the IAF's offensive successes of 1967 and 1982 provide an intriguing counterpoint to the 1973 case presented here.…”
Section: Cartermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cynthia Roberts has observed that in 'the early 1930s it was an article of faith, operationalised in Soviet war plans, that if the Soviet Union were attacked the Red Army would not surrender "one inch" of Soviet territory to the aggressor'. 69 During the last week of September 1938, Czechoslovakia had fully mobilized; Germany, Great Britain and France had each taken some preparatory steps toward war, as did others in Europe. The Soviet Union was involved in a shooting war in the Far East, there was the Spanish Civil War and there were serious tensions between Moscow and Warsaw as well as between Moscow and Bucharest.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%