Plant-Centered Virtue Ethics: A Cross-Talk between Agroecology and Ecosophy

Abstract

The claim that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) is anthropocentric appears inherently aporetic since it implies that either anthropocentrism is virtuous or the whole environmental issue is anthropocentric, thus translating vices into virtues or vice versa. Another interpretation is that both the environment and humanity are thought with a vicious conception of centeredness. Conversely, if centeredness is rightly addressed and humanity and its environment are considered as one and the same issue, the focus on anthropocentrism should also be different. By drawing on Felix Guatttari’s ecosophy, this paper proposes that EVE needs to be based on a philosophical understanding of agriculture. Thus, agriculture is the organic and epistemic matrix of our relation to the environment and not merely a section of an abstract environment nor one economic area among others. The environmental crisis is primarily a crisis of humanity within its agricultural matrix. To be an environmentally virtuous human being, a requirement is to face again the burden of our absolute need for food and for fruitful cooperation between farmers and plants, not only animals. This paper discusses the importance of plant ethics and plant topology to understand the specificities of the agricultural matrix. The emphasis will be placed on plant-centered virtue ethics and reframing anthropocentrism by drawing on transdisciplinary conversation with plant practitioners in the context of a research action project.

A Virtue Ethics Interpretation of the ‘Argument from Nature’ for Both Humans and the Environment

“…To some extent, the recent development of EVE may seem to tackle the issue by reintroducing Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, the notion of environment is mostly addressed under a positive naturalist argument (see, e.g., Pouteau, in this issue) [6]. While EVE may provide an adequate basis to make sense of the argument from nature, a first requirement is to unravel the intricate threads of the appeal to 'nature', considering that nature is not summed up by the term environment.…”

“…The 'person-affecting restriction' in population ethics states that 'one situation cannot be worse (or better) than another if there is no one for whom it is worse (or better)'; that is, the claim is that we cannot make assessments about well-being in the absence of an actual person about whom we are making the assessment [12] (p. 14). 6 When we wish our friend be transformed into a god or made immortal, the future 'better' state that we are wishing for is one in which our friend, as an individual and as a human being, no longer exists and, thus, there is no one for whom this wished-for state is better.…”