Plato and Aristotle on Form and Substance

Abstract

Plato and Aristotle give different answers to the question ‘What are the substances (ousiai)?’. One way Aristotle defends his answer is by arguing that his candidate substances – particulars such as Socrates or Callias – better satisfy the criteria for substance than do Plato's candidates – eternal, unchanging, nonsensible universals called ‘Forms’. This defense goes along with another. For Aristotle disagrees with Plato, not only about the candidates, but also about the criteria, for substance: one reason Plato fastens on to the wrong candidates is that he focuses on some of the wrong criteria.Aristotle mounts his defense in different ways in the Categories and Metaphysics. In both works he defends the priority of particulars. In the Cat., however, their nature is left unanalysed; and their priority is defended largely by appeal to unPlatonic criteria. In the Met., by contrast, Aristotle analyzes particulars into compound, form, and matter. Socrates, for example, may be viewed as a compound of his form (his soul) and his matter (his body); or he may be viewed as his form or soul. Further, Aristotle now invokes additional, Platonic criteria for substance; and this leads him to argue that it is Socrates as form that counts as primary substance; the primary substances are individual forms.

Proceedings of the 9th Conference of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science

“…We may not accept the argument, but it is highly plausible that Plato did view his Forms as having some kind of causal power (Fine 2003). 2 The problem, then, is not that Plato's forms lack causal power, but that the notion of efficient causality which is our contemporary scientific notion does not apply to the forms.…”

Aristotle and Mathematics

“…293a24, NE 1096al9. 33 This seems to be an implicit assumption made by Gail Fine (1993) when she analyses and explicates the arguments from On Fonns primarily with reference to an Aristotelian framework of concepts and terms; and only then checks them against the Platonic dialogues with predictable results. 34 Alexander, in Metaph.…”

“…Cleary (1987b) for my analysis of these arguments 'from the sciences.' See also Fine (1993) 66 ff. for a more extensive (and different) analysis.…”

“…47 Cf. Cooper (1973), Frank (1984b), & Fine (1980& Fine ( & 1993. 48 See Cleary (1987b) for an elaboration of this problem and a possible solution.…”

“…This is a priority relationship which might be more akin to the pros hen equivocity which Aristotle himself later accepts as a basis for a single science of metaphysics. 59 There are, of course, a number of other ways of interpreting this claim and these are connected with the argument from relatives in On Forms which also lists three ways in which the same thing can be predicated non-homonymously of many things; c£ Owen (1957) & Fine (1982. accidental predication in terms of whether or not the predicate (1:0 Ka'tmopou~Evov) always belongs to the subject.…”