Plato's Rejection of Thoughtless and Pleasureless Lives

Abstract

In the Philebus Plato argues that every rational human being, given the choice, will prefer a life that is moderately thoughtful and moderately pleasant to a life that is utterly thoughtless or utterly pleasureless. This is true, he thinks, even if the thoughtless life at issue is intensely pleasant and the pleasureless life at issue is intensely thoughtful. Evidently Plato wants this argument to show that neither pleasure nor thought, taken by itself, is sufficient to make a life choiceworthy for us. But there is some disagreement among commentators about whether or not he also wants the argument to show why. Is the argument designed to establish that we should reject thoughtless and pleasureless lives because some pleasures and some thoughts are goods? Or is it silent on this issue? Many interpreters take the first option, claiming that Plato uses the argument to attack both the hedonist view that only pleasures are goods and the intellectualist view that only thoughts are goods. My aim in this paper is to show that the second option is at least as attractive as the first, both exegetically and philosophically.

Next to Godliness: Pleasure and Assimilation in God in the Philebus

“…50 In maintaining that, in the Philebus, Plato does not treat pleasure as an intrinsic, but solely as a consequential good, I am obviously entering an area of vigorous interpretive controversy. Those who share my view include Evans (2007);Frede (1992), 440, 454;(1993), xliii, lvi, (1996Hampton (1990), 74;Van Riel (1999), 308;and Waterfield (1982), 86, n. 1. Opponents include Carone (2000); Cooper (1999), 160-1;and Irwin (1995), 336.…”

“…It will enable us to develop a better sense of Plato's views on the nature of the gods -why are the gods beings beyond pleasure? Furthermore, insofar as the gods are beings in the best possible state, and so, in a sense, constitute a normative 11 Evans (2007) offers a helpful contrast between final goods and subsidiaries, which allows for an intellectualist interpretation of the Philebus, according to which knowledge is a final good, pleasure a subsidiary which necessarily accompanies human (although not divine) intellectual activity. Frede (1992), 440, develops a similar position, calling pleasure a remedial good.…”

Uma Torah anti-hedonista em Fílon de Alexandria

“…Essa diferença para 20 Há quem sustente que Sócrates aceita a mistura por entender que a presença do prazer é algo inevitável (FREDE, 1985;EVANS, 2007), enquanto também há uma forte tendência a se reconhecer que o filósofo não pretende mesmo repudiar, mas sim incorporar o prazer (CARONE, 2000 A semelhança pela ênfase na delicadeza, fraqueza e, sobretudo, afastamento da masculinidade é notável. Faz-nos perceber que a inserção de Fílon na tradição filosófica não se revela apenas por aproximações com o pensamento passado, mas também pela proximidade que tem com a produção filosófica contemporânea, inclusive escrita em outro idioma.…”

Plato on Pure Pleasure and the Best Life

“…It would be unusual for the phrase è' | .x\jjuxov ysYovoc eîSoç to refer to the soul alone, and the context suggests that it refers to the whole 5 E.g. Butler 2007,108;Evans 2007a;D. Frede 1997, 296-7;1993, pp.…”

“…Despite the evidence that Plato recognizes the intrinsic value of a certain class of pleasures in the Philebus, some scholars object that this conclusion makes the good human life better and more choiceworthy than the life of a god; as Evans (2007A) puts it, such an outcome that would be 'impious' . In raising this objection, Evans identifies the life of a god with the pleasureless life of intelligence.…”