Play Versus Strategy Method: Behavior and the Role of Emotions in the Ultimatum Game

Nardi, Chiara

doi:10.1007/s40797-017-0070-2

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…The three outcome variables were measured in the UG task: (1) Allocation expectation, the amount that participants expect to receive from the proposer; (2) Acceptance possibility, the probability that participants accept each allocation with a percentage from 0 to 100% (Haselhuhn and Mellers, 2005), (3) Ingroup favoritism score, the difference in acceptance possibility for each offer between the ingroup and outgroup interaction (Schiller et al, 2014). Although both the games were hypothetical, that is, no monetary incentives or actual proposers were present, the results have been proven to be similar to those based on the direct response method (Nardi, 2018). The order of the two economic games and the different offers were counterbalanced between subjects.…”

Section: Ultimatum Gamementioning

confidence: 78%

“…Since offer 6:4 possessed higher uncertainty than the offer 8:2 during Study 1, we speculated that the ingroup favoritism difference between low and high victim sensitivity groups was mainly reflected in the offer 6:4. We used the hypothetical UG for two reasons: First, some research found that the results of both the hypothetical and incentivized game are usually similar (Nardi, 2018 ). Second, the hypothetical UG is more convenient and economic.…”

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Victim Sensitivity and Proposal Size Modulate the Ingroup Favoritism During Fairness Norm Enforcement

et al. 2021

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People show a strong aversion to inequality and are willing to sacrifice their own interests to punish violations of fairness norms. Empirical research has found that group membership could influence the fairness judgment and norm enforcement of the individuals but has shown inconsistent findings and has not focused much on the potential moderators. Here, the two studies aimed to investigate whether victim sensitivity and proposal size moderate the impact of group membership on reactions to unfair proposals. In both studies, the participants with different victim sensitivity (low vs. high group) played the hypothetical (Study 1) and incentivized (Study 2) ultimatum game under the intragroup and intergroup condition and indicated their responses to the different proposals. Results showed that, regardless of the victim sensitivity, ingroup member is often given preferential and positive treatment. Low victim sensitive persons are more likely to accept unfair offers from the ingroup than the outgroup, while this effect was attenuated for those with high victim sensitivity, especially for highly ambiguous unfair offers (offer 6:4 in Study 1 and 8:2 in Study 2). Moreover, the ingroup favoritism score for ambiguous unfair offers was smaller for high compared with the victim sensitivity group. Taken together, the victim sensitivity, and proposal size could moderate the ingroup favoritism on responses to unfairness.

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Section: Ultimatum Gamementioning

confidence: 78%

Section: Studymentioning

confidence: 99%