Playing the muscle-man or new self-assuredness? Germany and the Iraq War

Abstract

This article describes the catalysing effect of the Iraq War for the coming-of-age of Germany and its foreign policy after decades of having a defensive and pacifist approach in general and of playing the part of a loyal and helpful junior partner to the United States in particular. Germany's political emancipation was a result of the reunification and the disappearance of the threats connected to the EastWest confrontation. Following the Cold War, subordination under the American security umbrella no longer seemed necessary for German survival. Nonetheless, it took a dozen years for Germany to transform from a consumer to a producer of security in Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Kuwait and elsewhere until the RedGreen (Social Democratic and Green Party of Germany) coalition of 2002 was convinced Germany had the right to be consulted by its partners before they undertook far-reaching political and military initiatives and that it had the right to a differing opinion. Since the political convictions and biographies of the initiators of the German Way seem to have had a decisive influence on their handling of the Iraq War controversy, a second foreign policy of similar calibre this time under Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leadership would be necessary to convince sceptics of the irreversibility of Germany's emancipation.

Last Minute Policies and the Incumbency Advantage

“…The German general election on 22 September 2002 presents a fitting illustration of the modeled mechanism. The incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schröder ( I ) led a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens, which, at the end of July 2002, was ‘trailing the conservative opposition ( C ) by a substantial margin’ in the opinion polls (Fürtig, , p. 315).…”

“…Indeed, in response to worsening public opinion polls, Schröder's party ‘decided on 1 August to begin the final phase of the re‐election campaign earlier than planned’ (Fürtig, , p. 315). That day he stated: ‘We have alarming news from the Middle East.…”

“…[…] Germany is willing to show solidarity, but is not available for adventures’. (Ddp News Agency quoted in Fürtig, , p. 316). Schröder thus used information that his government position brought in order to strongly impact the perceived relevance of the topic of war and terrorism.…”

“…Within one month of the above statement, the perceived importance of the Iraq conflict jumped from 6th to 2nd rank although it was very uncertain that a war would ever be fought and German support ever requested from the United States. The elections on 22 September saw the incumbent coalition confirmed (Fürtig, , p. 317).…”

“…In our exemplary case, the three distortions would be 1) the inability to perfectly identify an emergency on an issue like the Iraq invasion from the words of the Schröder administration during an election campaign, 2) a biased agenda with terrorism suddenly and possibly undeservedly rivaling the importance of the economic problems and 3) the voter's reduced choice set if the challenger copies the incumbent's position, like Stoiber, the conservative candidate, initially attempted (Fürtig, , p. 318).…”