Plugging the Accountability Gap? Evaluating the Effectiveness of Regional Scrutiny

Abstract

Introduction Our aim in this paper is to explore key influences on the effectiveness of regional scrutiny arrangements. The creation of a scrutiny role for the English Regional assemblies in relation to their respective Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) comes after the establishment of overview and scrutiny committees within local government and the introduction of health scrutiny. The Labour government contends that scrutiny assists in plugging the`accountability gap'. However, prior research on scrutiny demonstrates that it has several key limitations as an instrument of accountability. For example, a review of the literature on parliamentary select committees suggests that they have struggled to scrutinise the work of the executive effectively (Ashworth et al, 2001a; Garrett, 1992; Polidano, 2001). In this paper, we identify five variables which currently influence the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny and argue that these variables have important implications for the success of regional scrutiny. RDAs were created in order to address an economic deficit. However, the government recognised that creating these regional quangos would further exacerbate the democratic deficit (Morgan, 2002). Consequently, it was proposed that the scrutiny of RDA plans, strategies, and performance would be a key function performed by regional assemblies, which were established``to add a (thin) veneer of regional accountability'' (Jeffery and Mawson, 2002, page 715). The regional scrutiny role originates from the 1988 Regional Development Agencies Act, which states that each RDA must``have regard, in the exercise of its functions, to any views expressed by the chamber, and to consult the chamber in relation to the exercise of such of its functions'' (section 8). However, RDA functions and budgets have continued to expand. Determining that further expansion should be accompanied by enhanced scrutiny, the government outlined a more substantial scrutiny remit in March 2001 in the consultation paper

Boon or bane for development? Turkey’s central state bureaucracy and the management of public investment

“…While the analysis stresses the importance of strong and autonomous bureaus, it does not argue the case for a traditional ‘top-down’ bureaucratic structure. Many researchers have indeed underscored the risks linked to overly relying on the central state and the lack of grass-root participation in local and regional development programmes (Ashworth et al., 2007; Bosch et al., 2012; Jaramillo and Wright, 2015; Steelman, 2001), or the risks of wrong policy choices caused by a central planner lacking information about local needs (Dulupçu, 2005). Yet, results are a reminder of how a capable and strong central bureaucracy shielded from political power is a prerequisite to limit the problems which frequently cause ‘democratic failures’ (Besley, 2006) around the world.…”

Black gold to green gold: regional energy policy and the rehabilitation of coal in response to climate change

“…State restructuring, a component of the neoliberal project, has meant that unaccountable bodies such as RDAs have an increasing number of functions and control over spending. With the announcement in July 2007 that regional assemblies are to be abolished and RDA powers strengthened, the accountability gap noted by Ashworth et al (2007) looks set to widen. Whilst new governance structures may have the potential to increase community involvement, this study would support previous findings that at present these networks have little power over the traditional hierarchy.…”

“…To achieve its goals the RDA in each region works with the local Government Office (GO) and Regional Assembly (RA) (Tomaney 2002; Smith 2007). The complex relationship between these three can have a significant impact on the development and implementation of policies (Ashworth et al 2007).…”

The Amsterdam Metropolitan Area Challenge: Opportunities for Inclusive Coproduction in City-Region Governance

“…Transparency, civic involvement, and the inclusion of political beliefs in the policy-making process might then be forgotten altogether. In such a situation unelected city-regional policy networks that operate on a voluntary basis can be perceived as less legitimate than more mandatory and institutionalized forms of city-regional governments that have often safeguarded legitimacy by law, either directly or through members who occupy elected local authority positions within the region (Ashworth et al, 2007;Morgan, 2002).…”