The variety of solutions to organize economic activities is striking, and underexplored. This paper proposes a framework that combines transaction cost and relational contracts models to capture this variety while characterizing some representative forms. The framework distinguishes between organizational structures differing according to the intensity of control exercised over the rights to use resources, and the modalities of governance through which these structures operate. The combination of these two dimensions provides tools for understanding the existence, characteristics, and conditions under which some organizational arrangements tend to prevail. Based on these premises, the paper proposes an analysis that goes beyond the dichotomy between "markets" and "hierarchies." This framework is inclusive of those hybrids arrangements that play such an important role in the agrifood industry and it explores two modalities that are particularly challenging to standard theories: cooperatives and plural forms. [EconLit citations: D 230; L 0; Q 100].MÉNARD 143 that support agrifood activities. Governance here is intended as the set of devices implemented within organizations, or among networks of organizations, to allocate and monitor assets and rights, providing the backbone to economic activities. Hence, governance identifies the means that make alternative organizations operational, whereas organizations are the structures entitled of rights and performing transactions, structures within which modalities of governance are embedded (e.g., a cooperative is an organization, whereas its decision-making rules constitute a modality of governance).These two interwoven components, organization and governance, are essential for understanding how an economic system works. As Ronald Coase (Coase, 1937(Coase, , 1998 indicated, finding the appropriate organization of transactions influences the capacity of taking advantage of the division of labor and specialization that feed growth. And it is through the modalities of governance associated to alternative organizations, for example, the type of contract linking partners, that bargaining power is delineated and that negotiations develop. Indeed, from an economic point of view a negotiation is primarily about the allocation of rights to use goods or services, which characterizes the type of organization and determines the power of the different parties involved. This paper explores these issues along the following lines. Section 2 discusses why the variety of organizations and their modalities of governance matter so much to theoreticians as well as decision makers. Section 3 revisits two theories, TCEs and relational contracts, which complement each other in supplying essential tools for understanding organizational diversity and its logic. Section 4 discusses some particularly challenging cases when it comes to applying this framework to the analysis of the agrifood industry. Section 5 concludes.
WHY DO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES MATTER?Identifying the various organizations and...