Polarization Without Poles: Machiavellian Conflicts and the Philippines’ Lost Decade of Democracy, 2000–2010

Abstract

The Philippines’ long democratic experience has been remarkably free of deeply politicized cleavages. Roman Catholicism as a hegemonic religion prevents religious polarization, ethnic identity fragmentation limits ethnic polarization, and weak parties forestall ideological or class polarization. Nevertheless, the country suffered a crisis of polarization during the short-lived Estrada presidency (1998–2001) and that of his successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001–2010). The severe conflict was a product of power maneuvers by anti-Estrada forces, followed by anti-Arroyo actors returning the favor, given her gross abuses of power. Echoing Machiavelli’s famous distinction, the conflict pitted Estrada’s popoli (the many) against Arroyo’s oligarchic grandi (the few). This Machiavellian conflict ended with an oligarchic reassertion of Madisonian democratic rule through the electoral victory of Benigno Simeon Aquino III in 2010. We conclude the article by considering whether the populist challenge of current president Rodrigo Duterte (2016– ) might spark a similarly destabilizing conflict in the years to come.

Authoritarian values and institutional trust: Theoretical considerations and evidence from the Philippines

“…During Estrada’s regime, the country was engulfed in another popular revolution that saw the return of People Power through the removal of President Estrada due to allegations of corruption and plunder (Kasuya, 2003; Landé, 2001). Not seen since the ouster of the Marcos dictatorship, it was the first instance of significant political change in post-authoritarian Philippines led by a coalition of the middle classes demanding accountability and collective mobilization (Abinales, 2001; Arugay, 2005; Arugay and Slater, 2019; Rivera, 2001) and facilitated by the media (Coronel, 2001; Rafael, 2003). During this troubled political time, then-Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the Presidency—marking the first and only time in Philippine political history that a Vice-President has become President after political upheaval.…”

“…For instance, Estrada’s ‘politics of sincerity’ appealed much to the poor who emerged not simply as gullible supporters but as “politically savvy, conscientious political actors operating within the bounds of distinct but well-grounded criteria” (Garrido, 2017: 681). Even at the height of the 2001 political crisis which left the citizenry divided into “hostile yet nonideological blocs” (Arugay and Slater, 2019: 132), these ‘populist’ Estrada supporters clashed with other groups/actors, e.g. the Catholic Church, business groups, and civil society organizations, that sided with Arroyo’s extralegal installation—lest they viewed their ‘caring’ elected leader was unjustly treated.…”

“…To test this, it is essential to take a step back to before Duterte's regime-not only for theoretical and empirical validity but because most of the existing studies do not capture a broad canvas of Philippine political history. For instance, little is known about the political dynamics and polarization (or lack of poles and cleavages) in the "lost decade of democracy"-between 2000 and 2010 (Arugay and Slater, 2019), and yet a form of 'populist' support manifested among citizens toward leaders deemed to be sincere and caring besides having electoral motivation (Garrido, 2017).…”

Democratization and the Construction of Class Cleavages in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, 1992–2019

“…More than 170 ethnolinguistic groups, the biggest being the Visayas (about 25 percent) and the Tagalog (about 25 percent), populate these islands. 4 Despite this diversity, ethnic antagonism has been relatively rare in the history of the Philippines (Arugay & Slater 2018). The exception is Mindanao, where migration from Luzon after World War II led to repeated conflicts in Muslim areas opposing the armed forces to separatist movements.…”

Elite capture, civil society and democratic backsliding in Bangladesh, Thailand and the Philippines

“…150 The 1998 election of Estrada, who appealed directly to the poor, initiated fierce but largely non-ideological "elite-driven" polarization between "oligarchical" and "populist" elites. 151 In 2001, the People Power II protests against Estrada's corruption led the military to withdraw its support, leading to Estrada's downfall. Middle-class 152 and non-ND leftist CSOs as well as the Catholic Church, capitalist oligarchs 153 and traditional political elites played a key role in convening the demonstrations, illustrating the readiness of the middle class and oligarchic elites to overturn the verdict of the voting-majority poor.…”