Policies on illegal immigration in a federation

Mayr, Karin; Minter, Steffen; Krieger, Tim

doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.08.005

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…They confirm that there are gains from coordination, but highlight that cost sharing across jurisdictions might not be optimal. Focusing directly on irregular migration, Mayr, Minter and Krieger (2012) look at the spillover effects generated by the decision by one country belonging to a federation to grant an amnesty to the irregular migrants that it hosts. Free mobility across national borders implies that this decision will carry important repercussions on the other member states.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

Casarico¹,

Facchini²,

Frattini³

2015

CESifo Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The combination of increasing immigration pressures and restrictive policies imperfectly enforced by many destination countries has made illegal immigration widespread. This paper provides an overview of the mechanisms behind the formation of migration policies and how they lead to or they limit the presence of illegal immigrants. We also study how governments deal ex-post with the presence of undocumented foreign workers by introducing immigration amnesties. We review the determinants of their introduction and address their desirability from the point of view of aggregate welfare. As countries in the EU differ substantially in the implementation of both ex-ante and ex-post immigration policies, we emphasize the need for more coordination in the area of migration policy enforcement, both at the border and within each country.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

Casarico¹,

Facchini²,

Frattini³

2015

CESifo Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…8 A great deal of literature studies joint provision of public goods within a sequential or simultaneous game (see for example Warr, 1982 and1983;Cornes and Sandler, 1984;Bergstrom et al, 1986;Varian, 1994). With respect to the funding of border control, Mayr et al (2011) only consider simultaneous decisions. They do not study what happens when a country can exploit the advantage of being the first mover.…”

Section: Endnotesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, we move from a political economy perspective, and our work is mainly related to two contributions: Mayr et al (2011) and Haake et al (2010). The first article studies the joint funding of immigration restriction when a border country may legalize illegal immigrants who are then entitled to move to an interior country.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy

Russo

Senatore

2013

IZA J Migration

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Who pays for immigration control? According to the Lisbon Treaty the cost of enforcing the European border against illegal immigration shall be shared among the EU members. Nonetheless, the Treaty is vague with respect to the "appropriate measures" to adopt in order to distribute the financial burden. Members who do not share their borders with source countries have an incentive to free ride on the other countries. We study a novel contribution game in which a border country and a central country minimize a loss function with respect to their national immigration target. We consider both sequential and simultaneous decisions and we show that joint contribution occurs only if the immigration targets are not too different. Total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game, but the sequential framework reduces the incentive to free ride. Jel codes: D78, H72, H77

show abstract

“…Bandyopadhyay and Pinto (), Giordani and Ruta (), Mayr, Minter, and Krieger () considered multiple destination countries. Mayr et al (), focusing on external enforcement and amnesty policies in the single‐border case, show that total enforcement spending is likely to be inefficiently low, which is consistent with our results from the single‐border case. Giordani and Ruta () analyze the common‐border case, limiting their attention, however, only to external enforcement policy by symmetric countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations

Miyagiwa

Sato

2018

Journal of Regional Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We develop a multicountry model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country’s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.

show abstract

Policies on illegal immigration in a federation

Cited by 11 publications

References 33 publications

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges

Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy

Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About