2016
DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2015.2478436
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Policing 802.11 MAC Misbehaviours

Abstract: Abstract-With the increasing availability of flexible wireless 802.11 devices, the potential exists for users to selfishly manipulate their channel access parameters and gain a performance advantage. Such practices can have a severe negative impact on compliant stations. To enable access points to counteract these selfish behaviours and preserve fairness in wireless networks, in this paper we propose a policing mechanism that drives misbehaving users into compliant operation without requiring any cooperation f… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 33 publications
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“…Second, Internet layer attacks bring less pronounced benefit to the attacker and less pronounced harm to the honest nodes than does aggressive competition for the radio channel under link-layer TRAs. Single-hop settings are also easier to defend: when a traffic remapping attacker has been identified, it can be punished by neighboring honest nodes via responding in kind, e.g., increased transmission rate or jamming [46]. In a multi-hop setting, however, the punishment of TRAs may prove ineffective if known local-scope defense mechanisms are directly mimicked.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, Internet layer attacks bring less pronounced benefit to the attacker and less pronounced harm to the honest nodes than does aggressive competition for the radio channel under link-layer TRAs. Single-hop settings are also easier to defend: when a traffic remapping attacker has been identified, it can be punished by neighboring honest nodes via responding in kind, e.g., increased transmission rate or jamming [46]. In a multi-hop setting, however, the punishment of TRAs may prove ineffective if known local-scope defense mechanisms are directly mimicked.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Once detected [2], [4], selfish MAC-layer attacks launched by the relay station A cannot be simply punished by banning the attacker from further communication (by deauthentication and blacklisting), as this would mean loss of network access for station B. Revoking A's privileged status at the AP is one possibility.…”
Section: Defense Measuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For the implementation of Imola we use the Broadcom BCM4318 wireless cards. The motivation behind this hardware choice is twofold: (i) a MAC central processing unit (CPU) controls the card's behaviour in real time by running a dedicated firmware, which is an essential feature given the strict timing requirements of our protocol; and (ii) the device is deployable with the OpenFWWF open-source firmware, 7 which provides enhanced programmability and access to the card's internals, as documented by recent research [28][29][30] . Although these cards do not support sub-gigahertz operation, which are characteristic to TVWS, our proof-of-concept implementation provides sufficient insights into the feasibility of running Imola in practical multi-hop wireless networks.…”
Section: Hardware Platformmentioning
confidence: 99%