Policing Afghanistan

Giustozzi, Antonio; Isaqzadeh, Mohammed

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199327942.001.0001

Cited by 38 publications

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“…There are empirical and theoretical reasons for this choice. Empirically, I follow Giustozzi (2012) and Perelli and Smith's (2014) diagnoses that, despite all its problems, the electoral process in Afghanistan was not a sham. The actors involved followed institutional procedures, mainly because they saw them as sources of political legitimacy.…”

Section: Hybridization and Electoral Systemsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…On the other hand, recent studies have put more emphasis on another set of problems. In particular, non-state armed groups running in elections (Giustozzi 2012), elites fighting amongst themselves for control of the state (Sharan 2011), and a lack of attention to local politics on the part of international actors has created a situation in which elections and democracy have been perceived by the majority of the population to be nothing more than an arena for different groups to compete for power (Coburn and Larson 2014).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Gomes

2018

Rev. bras. polít. int.

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• Este é um artigo publicado em acesso aberto e distribuído sob os termos da AbstractDeparting from the hybridity literature on peacebuilding and electoral studies, this paper treats democratization in Afghanistan as a hybridization process. As a result, to understand the durability of corruption, fragile political parties, and non-democratic practices in the country, one should look more closely at the interplay between the current electoral system and how elites and local people respond to it.

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Section: Hybridization and Electoral Systemsmentioning

confidence: 96%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Gomes

2018

Rev. bras. polít. int.

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“…8 Often, the Ministry of Finance representative who 'was supposed to supervise the CoP' would have involvement in such corruption. 9 There are certain factors motivating police corruption such as the possible illicit rewards to be won by engaging in poppy trafficking. This usually occurs at the provincial level with local power brokers and the local government.…”

Section: Forms Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There are clear ethnic patterns when studying CoP appointments from different Ministers of Interior: for instance, Tajiks and Uzbeks were heavily over-represented in 2002 due to the Northern Alliance reaping the benefits from the defeated Taliban and Tajiks are still over-represented. 18 …”

Section: Forms Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ranks were previously 'top heavy' due to appointments based on patronage, resulting in too many generals, colonels, captains, majors and very few lieutenants. 68 After pay reform, the lowest scale of the AUP, patrolmen, had increased in size from 36,600 to 45,880, but the wages remained low at US$70-80 per month. 69 This is a cause for concern as the majority of the ANP consists of patrolmen.…”

Section: Pay Reform Recruitment and Stationingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption and clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police

Singh¹

2014

Conflict, Security & Development

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IntroductionIn Afghanistan, administrative corruption, state capture, systemic and political corruption, patronage, cronyism, bidding for Chief of Police (CoP) appointments and drug-related corruption has hindered effective law enforcement. This is due to the fact that institutions and anti-corruption units have been infiltrated by the government to serve criminal interests.Those criminal interests are often linked to the drug trade. As a number of experts have observed, many elements of Afghan government structures serve individual patrons and not the wider public interest. 1 For instance, appointments of senior officials, such as police chiefs and provincial governors, are based on bidding wars: positions regularly sell for hundreds of thousands of United States (US) dollars and these positions cost even more in high drug producing areas. 2 This has distorted both the provision of security and the rule of law.The rule of law is perverted by the Afghan police to serve all manner of criminal activities, such as: drug trafficking (and preserving the interests of criminal groups involved in trafficking), land theft, real estate swindling, tax and customs evasion, the operation of illegal security forces and illegal monopolies on markets with legal goods, and so forth. The Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan government are perceived as highly corrupt in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. This has led to public discontent toward an illegitimate government and police force that has arguably remobilised support for the Taliban. As a consequence, the security situation has further deteriorated. Therefore, a robust anticorruption strategy for the Afghan police force is required due to the fact that-as is held to be central to the proper functioning of a liberal state-the police and judges are pivotal law enforcement actors.This article examines the features of corruption and clientelism in the Afghan police and assesses the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies implemented to date. In the first section, the research methodology is outlined and this is followed by an overview of the different forms corruption takes and the perceptions of corruption among ordinary Afghans.This allows for a consideration of four prominent causes of corruption in the Afghan police.Subsequently, the following two sections discuss internal Ministry of Interior (MoI) anticorruption strategies, pay reform, recruitment and stationing in the ANP. This provides the basis for an analysis of the findings from the original research conducted by the author, consisting of interviews and surveys. It provides insights with respect to the respondents' perceptions on pay and living costs, corruption, clientelism and anti-corruption strategies.The article finds that pay reform alone will fail to combat systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture. Moreover, care needs to be taken when randomly assigning low-paid policemen, particularly sole breadwinners, in distant provinces to undermine the phenomenon of policemen remaining loyal to local po...

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Wealth-destroying states

Murtazashvili

2019

Public Choice

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Policing Afghanistan

Cited by 38 publications

References 0 publications

Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Hybrid democracy: electoral rules and political competition in Afghanistan

Corruption and clientelism in the lower levels of the Afghan police

Wealth-destroying states

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