Policing Corporate Collusion*

Scott, Donald W.

doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb01046.x

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…When organizational conduct is hidden from public view and external monitors lack direct access to organizational practices, whistleblowing yields information about illegal activities that cannot be uncovered in any other way. Whistleblowers provide access to violations that are routinely shielded by private authority and organizational labyrinths (Scott 1989).…”

Section: Nature Of Occupational and Organizational Misconductmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whistleblowing and the Control of Organizational Misconduct*

Miethe

Rothschild

1994

Sociological Inquiry

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The current study reviews the literature on whistleblowing and examines its role in detecting and controlling organizational misconduct. We begin with a definition of this concept, show how micro‐level theories of “deviance” explain whistleblowing, summarize evidence on its prevalence and correlates, and examine the legal protection of whistleblowers against organizational retaliation. The effectiveness of whistleblowing legislation in encouraging the reporting of organizational misconduct is also discussed. The article concludes with a discussion of the relative costs and benefits of whistleblowing as a method of social control of organizational misconduct.

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Section: Nature Of Occupational and Organizational Misconductmentioning

confidence: 99%

Whistleblowing and the Control of Organizational Misconduct*

Miethe

Rothschild

1994

Sociological Inquiry

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“…People who witness the wrongdoing or have knowledge of the same have different perspectives of the wrongdoing, some may take it to higher levels to stop the wrongdoing, and others may consider it lightly even though they themselves reckon it as a wrong activity (Janis, 1972, cited in Dozier & Miceli, 1985, p. 835). Thus it has been rightly propagated by Scott (1989) that whistle-blowers are the source to provide passage to outrages that are commonly guarded by private authority and organisational puzzles and misconducts.…”

Section: Review Of Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Comparison of Whistle-blower Protection Mechanism of Select Countries

Sharma

Kanojia

Sachdeva

2018

Indian Journal of Corporate Governance

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Whistle-blower protection mechanisms (WPMs) play a critically significant role in combating corruption through ethics, corporate governance and statutes. This article examines the essence of whistle-blower mechanism existing in the developed and developing countries in order to unearth the legislative structure of countries supporting the whistle blower mechanism and pursuit of ethical conduct for sound corporate governance. The article attempts to identify, evaluate and analyse the attributes of whistle-blower mechanism across nations and finds that despite offsymmetric attributes, the mechanisms are asymmetric specific to the countries' corporate culture. It has also been found that most significant attribute of a sound whistle-blower mechanism is the level of protection provided to the whistleblowers followed by coverage of sectors, anonymity and the regulator of whistleblowing complaints in the country. The attributes vary widely across nations on the basis of coverage of sectors, anonymity withheld and the level of protection, with United States of America delivering the best protection to whistle-blowers trailed by Australian whistle-blower protection laws and then South Africa; India, China and Indonesia lag considerably behind in having a sound whistle-blower mechanism.

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“…In such cases, collusion may be masked through rotating bid arrangements 7 . According to Scott (1989), incentives to collude are intensified when price and output decisions are made independently. This is the normal practice of carriers, where actuaries and underwriters work independently.…”

Section: The Role Of Contingent Commissions In the Insurance Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Value of Contingent Commissions in the Property–Casualty Insurance Industry: Evidence From Stock Market Returns

Ghosh¹,

Hilliard²

2010

J of Risk & Insurance

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Insurance producer compensation has incorporated contingent commissions for decades. In 2004, the New York State Attorney General sued insurers and brokers, alleging compensation abuses and calling for elimination of some forms of contingent commissions. Daily stock price return data reveal negative announcement-period portfolio returns for property-casualty carriers, suggesting expected negative cash flow effects. Firm-level losses were related to intensity of contingent commission use, suggesting that the effects of such regulatory changes would be felt most by firms that relied on contingent commissions. Investors believed contingent commissions were valuable not only for producers but also for carriers.

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Policing Corporate Collusion*

Cited by 8 publications

References 14 publications

Whistleblowing and the Control of Organizational Misconduct*

Whistleblowing and the Control of Organizational Misconduct*

Comparison of Whistle-blower Protection Mechanism of Select Countries

The Value of Contingent Commissions in the Property–Casualty Insurance Industry: Evidence From Stock Market Returns

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