Policing Social Distancing: Gaining and Maintaining Compliance in the Age of Coronavirus

Abstract

Drawing on motivational posturing theory (MPT) and procedural justice theory (PJT), this article makes recommendations for how best to secure compliance with social distancing regulations. Applying those theories to—mostly observational—data from a study on the use and impact of penalty notices for disorder, the influences on cooperation during police–citizen encounters are explored. Whilst focusing on the English data/regulations, as both MPT and PJT have been tested internationally, the conclusions have relevance beyond these shores. The article proposes a sixth posture—compulsion, a form of resistant compliance—to the five set out by MPT. Focusing attention not just on whether compliance is achieved but how recognizes the risk to future legitimacy posed by only achieving compliance through coercion or the threat thereof. Lessons from the research are applied to policing social distancing, with regards to: securing compliance during interactions, self-regulation and enforcement action, and how to preserve police legitimacy.

Policing COVID-19 physical distancing measures: managing defiance and fostering compliance among individuals least likely to comply

“…The COVID-19 context enabled measurement of both receipt of procedurally just treatment by police and compliance with legal restrictions within a concurrent and very recent time period, something that is challenging in normal contexts, as both contact with police and the opportunity to cooperate with police or to contravene laws occurs relatively infrequently for the general population. Thus, it may be that procedurally just treatment by police can foster compliance among disengaged individuals in the short-term, but that longstanding beliefs about the illegitimacy or untrustworthiness of police can over-shadow these experiences, leading to short-lived impacts on compliance (see Grace 2020). The unique conditions of the pandemic may also be more amenable to encouraging compliance among disengaged individuals, who seem to be motivated to comply with restrictions due to concerns about the health risk to loved ones.…”

“…In other words, the pandemic personalises the potential consequences of non-compliance to these individuals (Murphy et al 2020b). This motivation may create greater moral alignment with the legal restrictions, bolstering the perceived legitimacy of the restrictions, and potentially giving police greater persuasive power with which to secure enhanced compliance (Grace 2020, Jackson et al 2012.…”

Policing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Exploratory Study of the Types of Organizational Changes and Police Activities Across the Globe

“…Yet, to obtain voluntary or normative compliance with the strict measures, the police should optimally rely on positive police–community partnerships to bolster legitimacy (Grace, 2020; Jennings & Perez, 2020). Curtailing positive police–community contacts reduces the means of effectively communicating and partnering with the community.…”

High Level of (Passive) Compliance in a Low-Trust Society: Hong Kong Citizens’ Response Towards the COVID-19 Lockdown

“…In the current literature ( Braithwaite, 1989 ; Tyler, 1990 ; Mastrofski et al , 1996 ; Grace, 2020 ; Stott et al , 2020 ), there are two perspectives on why people comply with the law or orders of law enforcement agencies. The first perspective is instrumental in nature, taking the form of deterrence by either formal or informal sanctions ( Braithwaite, 1989 ; Mastrofski et al , 1996 ).…”

“…On the other hand, law enforcement officers must take an ‘engage and explain’ approach by indicating a willingness for open and direct communication with citizens, and clearly inform the public that they would listen to their views, explain the rationales of policing actions, and be procedurally just in implementation ( Myhill and Quinton, 2011 ; Farrow, 2020 ). As suggested by the pilot research of Grace (2020) , if compliance is achieved solely through ‘coercion or the threat thereof’, it would risk ruining the future legitimacy of law enforcement agencies, and consequently increase the future chance of non-compliance, especially when these actions are not detected. In the long run, the expense of ensuring compliance would become too high to be bearable ( Stott et al , 2020 ), especially in countries in which people have low political trust towards the government.…”