Policing the Waves: Maritime Paramilitaries in the Asia-Pacific

Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?

“…This is particularly important for Japan, where constitutional restrictions effectively prevent the deployment of military forces for anything other than self-defence. 14 Yet all adjustments carry their own risks. As Le Mière suggests, the use of non-military vessels has the potential to lower the threshold for hostile action, and this risk could be exacerbated by increased reliance on such forces.…”

Legal or illegal? —Transferring jurisdiction in the course of maritime law enforcement

“…Currently, the promulgation of China's Coast Guard Law has aroused the vigilance of neighbouring States in the South China Sea and the U.S., the coast guard plays a critical role in resolving the ongoing disagreements concerning maritime rights and interests in the Asia-Pacific region [ 57 ]. In recent years, the surrounding waters of China have witnessed escalated tensions and a constant rise in the maritime power of neighbouring States.…”

Testing Indonesia’s decisiveness: Vietnam’s continuous presence in the North Natuna Seas

“…This study argues that Vietnam is attempting to solidify its sovereign claims in the contested waters by making its maritime assets present in those vast seas. As the maritime diplomacy literature explains, a significant reason why states adopt paragunboat diplomacy is that it allows a display of de facto sovereignty (Le Mière, 2011;Le Mière, 2014). This is especially relevant post-2022, as Vietnam is expected to halt its intrusions with the conclusion of the EEZ boundary lines between Vietnam and Indonesia.…”

“…With the framing of the recent crisis involving intrusions into Indonesia's North Natuna Seas under paragunboat diplomacy, this perspective contributes to the growing literature on the maritime diplomacy of civilian fleets. Le Miere first termed paragunboat diplomacy to showcase the rising number of maritime paramilitaries utilized as a foreign policy tool in the past decade (Le Mière, 2011). Following that, Basawantara also used this term to make sense of the non-military forces being used by Indonesia (Basawantara, 2020).…”