2018
DOI: 10.1002/eet.1822
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Policy coherence by subterfuge? Arenas and compromise‐building in the European Union's energy efficiency policy

Abstract: This paper looks at how policy-makers use various alternative decision arenas to avoid internal policy incoherence. Inconsistency between goals and measures in a policy indirectly results from conflicting interests pulling in different directions within a heterarchical institutional setting. To avoid deadlock, negotiators rely on consensusbuilding techniques such as watering down, issue redefinition, and the setting of targets without actions. These techniques facilitate moving away from the status quo, but th… Show more

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Cited by 9 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Before codecision became ordinary, the existence of multiple legislative rules made it possible to play the “treaty base game” (Rhodes, ), that is, to select the most “change‐friendly” institutional rules. Similarly, the delegation of environmental policy to the Commission and to transnational expert committees serves as exit from the JDT, to the extent that public controversy is replaced by technocratic consensus (Deters, ).…”
Section: Decision Traps and Their Exitsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Before codecision became ordinary, the existence of multiple legislative rules made it possible to play the “treaty base game” (Rhodes, ), that is, to select the most “change‐friendly” institutional rules. Similarly, the delegation of environmental policy to the Commission and to transnational expert committees serves as exit from the JDT, to the extent that public controversy is replaced by technocratic consensus (Deters, ).…”
Section: Decision Traps and Their Exitsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bargaining power in the fuel efficiency directive was slanted toward Germany, the least ambitious actor. There were no plans to push ahead with national regulation, as this would have had technical and legal drawbacks (Deters, ).…”
Section: Flexibility or Rollback?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The geographic scope of the study has primarily been Finland, even though the findings can be used to support more general ecodesign approaches by other stakeholders and countries as well. The defined development areas represent a cohesive and coherent (Deters, 2018) collection of different areas of action to be supported by public means, similarly as proposed on a regional scope by Jordan et al (2014). Companies also need to prioritize their actions in relation to the circular economy (Heyes et al, 2018).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, some scholars study barriers that arise in the interplay between institutions and actors. See for example, Howlett and Rayner's paper on path dependencies (2007), and Deters's analysis of policy entrepreneurs' ability to overcome institutional constraints when formulating goals (Deters, 2018). Although these studies differ both in analytical focus and in the solutions they offer, one important similarity stands out: they mainly identify barriers which policy makers must address to overcome incoherence .…”
Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%