Policy designs for interorganizational coordination: Lessons from failures in governing the mining sector in Colombia and Ecuador

Abstract

Scholars of mining policies are beginning to understand how the most recent boom in commodity prices (2000–2014) influenced the institutional development of the mining sector in Latin America. We contribute to this literature by studying the design, dynamics, and outcomes of interorganizational coordination in Colombia and Ecuador. Our findings show that, despite their divergent policies, both countries failed to integrate the mining sector's three main policy games—formalizing artisan and small‐scale operations, increasing the number of large‐scale projects, and tackling illegal extraction. Several characteristics of the design of coordination initiatives influenced policy failure—the reliance on hierarchy mechanisms to motivate coordination, the lack of specificity of the coordination mandates, and the lack of specific resources for coordination. Contextual factors also shaped the dynamics and outcomes of coordination. The limited geographical spread of artisanal and small‐scale mining and of illegal extraction, the environmental sector's weakness, and the creation of a multilayered structure for public‐sector coordination contributed to policy effectiveness in Ecuador. On the other hand, the ample spread of artisanal and small‐scale mining and of illegal extraction, the lack of a clear coordinating structure, and the environmental sector's growing vigor contributed to sustained policy failure in Colombia.

How do courts contribute to policy integration? A comparative study of policy integration processes in Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala

“…The government mobilized international support for this approach, promoting a decision in the Community of Andean Nations in 2012, which recognizes the importance of combating illegal mining due to the threats posed to national and regional security. Moreover, local opposition to the government’s militaristic policy was subdued by a campaign about the training programs for informal miners within a legalization program, the construction of infrastructure, and the reparation of environmental damages (Cisneros, 2021 ).…”

Economía política, filosofía e institucionalidad de la informalidad: reflexiones para los nuevos desafíos

“…Por el contrario, se toma como ilegal la actividad organizada que se vincula con actores irregulares para garantizar el dominio del mercado o el control de espacios y mano de obra. También la que se vincula con otras actividades económicas ilegales como el narcotráfico (Benites, 2022;Brombacher et al, 2021;Cisneros, 2021;Duff & Downs, 2019;Espin & Perz, 2021;Froese et al, 2022;Jonkman, 2019;Kaufmann & Côte, 2021;le Billon et al, 2020;Lugo, 2020;Monge, 2021;Saavedra & Romero, 2021;Veiga & Marshall, 2019;Wesche, 2022). Sin embargo, la frontera se desdibuja cuando la actividad minera se relaciona con la contaminación ambiental (Damonte, 2021;O'Brien et al, 2021;Veiga & Marshall, 2019) y con un mercado que permite que el mineral no registrado pueda ser comercializado con el objetivo de lavar dinero o de financiar grupos ilegales (Veiga & Marshall, 2019).…”

Afectaciones a la seguridad y defensa de Colombia por el fenómeno de la minería ilegal: percepción académica, escenario y posibles soluciones institucionales.

“…Como resultado, a pesar de sus políticas disímiles, Colombia fracasó en integrar los tres vitales juegos de políticas del sector minero: i) determinar las operaciones artesanales y de pequeña escala; ii) agrandar el número de proyectos de gran escala; y iii) afrontar la extracción ilegal. Asimismo, la amplia extensión de la minería artesanal, de pequeña escala y de extracción ilegal, la falta de una organización clara y la creciente energía del sector ambiental ayudaron al fracaso continuo de la política en Colombia (Cisneros, 2021).…”