Policy paradigms, subnational governance and the state sovereignty gap in Afghanistan

Abstract

It is argued that the battle to restore the sovereignty of the afghan state will be won or lost subnationally. Victory will be more likely if, following ghani and Lockhart (2008), citizen security can be assured; if the rule of law can be upheld without fear or favour; if reasonably effective, merit-based and accountable leadership and administrative means for service delivery can be institutionalized; and if social policies can be implemented which cut across regions and ethnic groups. However, progress towards these ambitious ends and the introduction in its support of pragmatic, evidence-based policy to strengthen the existing deconcentrated system of subnational governance (SNg) are hampered by stakeholder conceptual confusion about SNg, questionable donor altruism and largely incommensurable and irreconcilable SNg policy paradigms. Success will depend on whether links can be forged between SNg pragmatic imperatives and political expediency and on perceptions of policy compatibility with democracy promotion.

Development Undone: Weber, Kafka and the Organisation of Supply-Side Vested Interests

“…They are, therefore, largely conjectural and are susceptible to intersubjective testing only to the limited extent that any of the social sciences can approach the Popperian epistemological ideal (Popper, 1963, 1970). It is one that the author has employed many times before (e.g., Blunt, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Blunt & Turner, 2005; Blunt, Turner, & Lindroth, 2012; Blunt, Mamundzay, Yama, & Afghan, 2015; Blunt & Sainkhuu, 2015; Blunt & Khamoosh, 2016; Blunt, Mamundzay, & Nasary, 2017).…”

“…Four data sources are used to substantiate these claims (Blunt, 2014b; Blunt & Khamoosh, 2016; Blunt et al, 2015, 2017).…”

“…Most blatant of all, however, was the pursuit of decentralisation in circumstances where it was clear that government at the centre was unable to control large swathes of the country, which were either in the hands of the Taliban or other ‘subnational powerbrokers’, making state failure a distinct possibility. Supply-side agencies knew that there were a ‘multiplicity of sites of informal power outside of Kabul (apart from the Taliban, warlords and some governors)’ that contested ‘control over territory and other key resources among themselves and with the centre’ and flouted its authority, threatening ‘to fragment the state and to make it ungovernable’ (Blunt et al, 2015, p. 278). This finding is confirmed by Mehran (2018, p. 102), who found that ‘the inclusion of warlords in the state-building project has contributed greatly to widespread and systematic abuse of state offices for personal and private purposes.…”

“…But this was not the main reason that arguments regarding ‘the distribution of power and resources in government subnationally, and the rationality of keeping things more or less as they are (for now and the foreseeable future) and trying to make them work better’ were not heard. Despite having ‘a firm basis in national and subnational political economy, in the unpalatability to Western powers and to both sides in government and the Kabul political and business establishment of a return to chaos and, most importantly, in popular preferences’ (Blunt et al, 2015, p. 280), this argument was ignored because it did not contribute to the cosmetics of ‘democracy promotion’.…”

Public Administration in Afghanistan: Challenges and Way Forward

“…Afghanistan is a developing country with a population of nearly 32 million, low per capita income, and the economy is dominated by agriculture [1]. Afghanistan is landlocked and shares borders with Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China with a population of around 30 million, it has an area of 647,500 km 2 [2]. The administrative system in Afghanistan is Republic and concentrated central system.…”