Policy Positions of Bureaucrats at the Front Lines: Are They Susceptible to Strategic Communication?

Abstract

It is well established that bureaucrats' implementation of policies is influenced by their own policy positions, that is, their attitudes toward the given policies. However, what affects the policy positions of bureaucrats? This article focuses on whether the policy positions of bureaucrats at the front lines of government are susceptible to frames and cues embedded in communication. Based on the notion that bureaucrats often adhere to certain professional norms when developing their attitudes toward policies, the authors hypothesize that communication frames and cues that align policies with such norms move bureaucrats' policy positions in favor of the policy. Results of four studies in European and American settings among mid-and street-level bureaucrats show support for the hypothesized effect. They also show that aligning policies with dimensions outside professional norms is ineffective, possibly even producing opposite effects. Practitioner Points• The way a new policy is presented to street-level bureaucrats and middle managers directly affects their attitudes toward the policy. • Emphasizing aspects of the policy that are in accordance with professional norms of serving clients and building policies on research-based evidence are likely to make bureaucrats more sympathetic-or less negative-toward the policy. • Emphasizing other considerations such as client satisfaction surveys and economic concerns may cause bureaucrats to be more hostile toward the policy. • Managers and other decision makers must strategically consider how they communicate about new programs and policies.

Never Change a Winning Policy? Public Sector Performance and Politicians' Preferences for Reforms

“…Knowing that citizens can and will use performance data to inform their decisions on Election Day provides politicians with a strong electoral incentive to bear in mind such data when developing their policy positions (Mueller ). An elected official's—or a bureaucrat's—policy position thereby “indicates whether he or she favors (i.e., displays a positive attitude toward) or disfavors a policy” (Andersen and Jakobsen , 58). This leads to the first testable hypothesis about the link between public sector performance and politicians' reform preferences:

Hypothesis 1: Public sector performance affects politicians' reform preferences.

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“…Politicians should be informed about the level of public sector performance—and believe this information to be relevant and credible (James and Van Ryzin ; Nielsen and Moynihan ; Van Ryzin and Lavena 2013). Performance information is generally provided through some form of communication, which “surrounds every policy implemented by bureaucrats” (Andersen and Jakobsen , 57). Yet extensive research on public opinion formation highlights that individuals' attitudes are already susceptible to the communication of information.…”

“…Communication about performance data increases the salience of such information. This can be viewed as a “framing” effect “emphasizing one subset of considerations rather than others” (Andersen and Jakobsen , 57; see also Druckman et al ). As such, it affects what politicians think about when forming their policy position and is likely to strengthen the link between public sector performance and reform preferences.…”

“…As such, it affects what politicians think about when forming their policy position and is likely to strengthen the link between public sector performance and reform preferences. Communication furthermore provides explicit or implicit cues—that is, a “piece of information that enables individuals to make simplified evaluations without analyzing extensive information” (Andersen and Jakobsen , 57; Druckman et al ). Performance data reflect one such cue and may act as a decision heuristic to reach a particular policy position.…”

Do Government and Foreign Funding Influence Individual Donations to Religious Nonprofits? A Survey Experiment in Pakistan

“…Dietrich (2016) tests how donor agency officials from different countries respond to corruption and inefficient state institutions in recipient countries. Andersen and Jakobsen (2017) test how bureaucrats react to communication cues and find that communication frames and cues that align policies with norms are more likely to move bureaucrats' policy positions in favor of the policies. In the nonprofit field, scholars have employed survey experiments to generate insights about donor motivations.…”