Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Evans, Matt

doi:10.1111/polp.12242

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 55 publications

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“…For each ministerial term I coded the minister's time in office in months, party affiliation, party's seat share, the ideological colour of the government (left, right, unity), the candidate selection method used by the party at the time the minister was selected (inclusionary or exclusionary) (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). To account for the portfolio saliency to parties, I used Evans' (2018) expert survey with some adaptations.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cabinet ministers and the use of agenda‐setting power: Evidence from cabinet ministers in Israel

Shpaizman

2021

Policy Studies Journal

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Cabinet ministers in parliamentary democracies have significant agenda‐setting power. However, not all ministers use it equally. This paper examines what affects the ministers' use of their agenda‐setting power. It explores this question based on the case of Israel, using three measures of agenda change and in‐depth interviews with former ministers. The paper finds that limited agenda capacity constrains the ministers' agenda‐setting power. However, the ministers themselves do not see this as a significant constraint and point at motivation instead. Ministers holding a portfolio that is salient to their party are not likely to change the agenda more. Ministers from small parties change the agenda less, and so do ministers in ministries where a significant proportion of services are provided by street level bureaucrats. Ministers in ministries that are seen as more salient change the agenda more. These findings are consequential for understanding policy responsiveness and proportionality in policy response.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cabinet ministers and the use of agenda‐setting power: Evidence from cabinet ministers in Israel

Shpaizman

2021

Policy Studies Journal

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“…Adding to the coding that is based on the content of each decision, we collected information about each minister who was assigned responsibility for the decision-whether the primary responsible minister was a party leader, whether she was from the prime minister's party, the seat share in the Knesset held by the party of the primary responsible minister, and whether the portfolio the primary minister is responsible for is the most salient portfolio to the minister's party. The latter coding was based on a modification of Evans (2018), as explained in Appendix B. 3 Finally, we included a covariate for the ideological cohesiveness within the cabinet.…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning Co-Responsibility in Cabinet Decisions

Shpaizman

Cavari

2023

Comparative Political Studies

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In coalition governments, parties invest much effort to manage delegation costs to individual ministers. In this article, we examine an intra-executive mechanism for managing delegation costs: Assigning ministerial co-responsibility in cabinet decisions. Using data of cabinet decisions in Israel, we test when and under what conditions co-responsibility is assigned. We find that co-responsibility is assigned strategically by cabinet members weighing the risk of a drift against the costs of imposing co-responsibility. These findings demonstrate an understudied mechanism through which coalition governments narrow ministerial autonomy and informational advantage once policies reach the cabinet. In doing so, this research contributes to a better understanding of policymaking in coalition governments.

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“…Nevertheless, the discussion in the previous section of the paper has pointed out that actors also use evidence and scientific information in a policy-oriented way (Heclo, 1974;Budge & Laver, 1986;Strom, 1990;Evans, 2018). This form of evaluation use and learning captures the policy-seeking and puzzling intentions of decision-makers.…”

Section: Hypothesis 1amentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluation use and learning in public policy

Bundi

Trein

2022

Policy Sci

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Scientific evidence has become increasingly important for the decision-making processes in contemporary democracies. On the one hand, research dealing with the utilization of scientific knowledge in the political process has pointed out that decision-makers learn from evidence to improve policies to solve problems. On the other, scholars have underlined that actors learn from evidence to support their political interests regardless of how it affects the policy problem. One conventional insight from the policy learning literature is that higher salience of a policy issue makes it much less likely that decision-makers use evidence in an “unpolitical” way. Nevertheless, only few studies have investigated systematically how differences regarding issue salience between policy fields impact on how decision-makers learn from evaluations at the individual level. Using multilevel regression models on data from a legislative survey in Switzerland, this paper shows that salience and technical complexity of policy issues do not automatically lead to less policy learning and to more political learning from policy evaluations. Nevertheless, this article’s empirical analysis also points out that issue salience increases policy learning from evaluations if the policy issue is technically complex. Our findings contribute to research on policy learning and evidence-based policy making by linking the literature on policy evaluation and learning, which helps analyzing the micro-foundations of learning in public policy and administration.

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Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

Cited by 12 publications

References 55 publications

Cabinet ministers and the use of agenda‐setting power: Evidence from cabinet ministers in Israel

Cabinet ministers and the use of agenda‐setting power: Evidence from cabinet ministers in Israel

Minding (Your Own and) Others’ Business: Assigning Co-Responsibility in Cabinet Decisions

Evaluation use and learning in public policy

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