Political alienation and referendums: how political alienation was related to support for Brexit

Abstract

A common interpretation of the UK's Brexit vote is that it was an expression of antiestablishment sentiment, outrage and dismay from a politically alienated majority. This line of thinking suggests Brexit, like the electoral appeal of Donald Trump and parties such as the Five Star Movement, is but the latest manifestation of a growing disconnect between Western citizens and their democratic institutions. The direct role of political alienation in building support for such anti-establishment causes has, however, barely been examined. This study addresses this gap and uses previous literature on political alienation to build a model to test the claim that Brexit was (at least in part) driven by political alienation in UK citizens. The analyses show that while political alienation did have a substantial effect in making some citizens more likely to support Brexit-specifically those who lacked trust in the integrity of the political elite and felt that the political system was unresponsive-its impact overall was limited. Moreover, claims that Brexit was driven by political alienation understate how alienated from politics most people who were opposed to it also feel.

To leave or not to leave? Understanding the support for the United Kingdom membership in the European Union: Identity, attitudes towards the political system and socio-economic status

“…Those results imply that the interpretation of the Brexit referendum result as a combination of attachment to British identity and worries about immigration, lack of economic opportunities and dissatisfaction with the political class (Abrams, 2018; Carl et al, 2019; Curtice, 2017; Fox, 2020; Hobolt, 2016; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016; Iakhnis et al, 2018; Kriesi et al, 2012; Norris and Inglehart, 2018; Swales, 2016) should be rectified. Disadvantaged groups’ support for European integration is driven by identity aspirations not by economic interest.…”

“…are the same as those who did not’ (Knies, 2018: 98). Prior research on the attitude towards European integration and Brexit does not suggest that factors such as being Irish, and the number of households are relevant to the preference for Brexit (Abrams, 2018; Carl et al, 2019; Curtice, 2017; Fox, 2020; Hobolt, 2016; Iakhnis et al, 2018; Norris and Inglehart, 2018; Swales, 2016). However, I cannot exclude that ignoring attrition and the method of interviewing the survey members may limit the generalisability of the results.…”

“…The attitude towards European integration is also a second-order reflection of the dissatisfaction with the domestic political class and government. When given the opportunity, such as in EU referendums, people often use their vote as a punishment strategy towards the establishment and the government (Abrams, 2018; Fox, 2020; Hobolt, 2016; Iakhnis et al, 2018). Referendums on European integration proposed by the government have been often rejected, particularly when supported by mainstream political parties and experts (Hobolt, 2009).…”

“…The identity approach argues that European integration erodes national-based identity and generates scepticism among those who are more attached to their national identity (Carey, 2002;Carl et al, 2019;Curtice, 2017;Hobolt, 2016;Hobolt and de Vries, 2016;Marks, 2005, 2009). A second type of cultural explanation is that the attitude towards European integration is driven by the strategy of punishing or confirming the political establishment which during the Brexit referendum in general backed 'Remain' (Abrams, 2018;Fox, 2020;Franklin, 2002;Franklin et al, 1994Franklin et al, , 1995Hobolt, 2009;Hug, 2002;Iakhnis et al, 2018;Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Existing research offers mixed results regarding the relative importance of economic and cultural factors (Hobolt, 2016;Norris and Inglehart, 2018) and fails to account for some unexpected trends (Swales, 2016).…”

Brexit and the ‘left behind’: Job polarization and the rise in support for leaving the European Union

“…Although some existing studies on the causes of Brexit have included controls for occupation, job or work type in their regression models (Alabrese et al, 2019; Fox, 2021; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), this has not been a key focus of the empirical literature on the determinants of the leave vote, despite the fact that those in employment make up over half of eligible voters 1 . To address this gap, as well as focusing on the evolution of the leave vote, this paper analyses data from the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) over two periods leading up to the 2016 EU referendum to examine how increased support for leaving the EU varied between different groups of workers.…”