Political Appointments and Coalition Management in Brazil, 2007-2010

Abstract

Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.

Appearances can be Deceptive: Political Polarization, Agrarian Policy, and Coalitional Presidentialism in Brazil

“…Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers (), note that the MDA and INCRA were managed by the PT during Lula and Rousseff's administrations and have a significant number of positions of trust compared to other federal public administration bodies. In theory, this shows the relevance of agrarian reform to the PT, compared to previous governments (Penna and Rosa , 67), emphasizing an ideological distance from PT administrations on issues related to agrarian reform and the context of popular mobilizations, also when compared to the PSDB national governments of Cardoso (1995‐2002).…”

The Organizational Consequences of Politics: A Research Agenda for the Study of Bureaucratic Politics in Latin America

“…6 The review of the literature shows that articles using similar academic approaches are generally clustered by journal, even when the journals are dedicated to a region rather than a discipline (e.g., LAPS, JLAS, LARR). Most articles about Latin American bureaucracy in U.S. journals tend to approach the topic through the lens of political science, using quantification and comparison to examine the interaction of the bureaucracy and the political sphere and generally leaving aside the question of outputs (e.g., Eaton 2003;Hartlyn et al 2008;Dargent 2011;Praça et al 2011;Gingerich 2013;Carlin et al 2014). Meanwhile, work published in Latin American journals nearly always comes from the field of public administration (e.g., Pírez 2000;Repetto 2000;Palermo 2006;Regalsky 2010) and often takes a more descriptive approach and focuses more on policy outputs and civil service behavior.…”

All the President's Men and Women: Coalition Management Strategies and Governing Costs in a Multiparty Presidency

“…Yet, as Druckman noted more recently, “Extant work offers scant insight into the processes of governance” (, 482). A newer branch of literature has begun exploring the idea of ongoing administration or “coalition management,” particularly in the context of multiparty presidential regimes (e.g., Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power ; Hiroi and Renno ; Pereira and Melo ; Pereira, Power, and Raile ; Pereira, Power, and Rennó ; Praça, Freitas, and Hoepers ; Raile, Pereira, and Power ). The current project builds on such work by considering the various decisions and tools involved in coalition management and by considering the ways a multiparty president can minimize governing costs with coalition parties.…”

“…management," particularly in the context of multiparty presidential regimes (e.g., Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2014;Hiroi and Renno 2014;Pereira and Melo 2012;Pereira, Power, and Raile 2011;Pereira, Power, and Renn o 2005;Prac¸a, Freitas, and Hoepers 2011;Raile, Pereira, and Power 2011). The current project builds on such work by considering the various decisions and tools involved in coalition management and by considering the ways a multiparty president can minimize governing costs with coalition parties.…”