Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies

Abstract

By applying the Revelation Principle, we focus on how a sponsor, who possesses political authority, could minimise the efficiency losses when bureaucrats are experts - that is, when they control information about the true costs of public services production. Our results come in striking contrast to those in the literature on bureaucracies and public procurement. In a two-types setting, and in the absence of monitoring and control mechanisms, we find that the agency is productively efficient. Under certain conditions, the agency is also allocatively efficient, while, under others, the low-cost bureau oversupplies and the high-cost agency undersupplies its output. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Bureaucratic expertise, overconfidence, and policy choice

“…It is what the bureaucracy literature typically called "the specialized knowledge or expertise" (Altfeld & Miller, 1984;Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1987;Gailmard & Patty, 2007;Makris, 2006;Wildavsky, 1979). Issue-specific knowledge refers to detailed information and empirical data regarding a specific policy issue that is often tied to an agency's mission and operation.…”

“…Issue-specific knowledge refers to detailed information and empirical data regarding a specific policy issue that is often tied to an agency's mission and operation. It is what the bureaucracy literature typically called "the specialized knowledge or expertise" (Altfeld & Miller, 1984;Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1987;Gailmard & Patty, 2007;Makris, 2006;Wildavsky, 1979). This specialized knowledge, or expertise, is one focus of this study.…”

“…Studies in these disciplines suggest that experienced experts are prone to overconfidence about their expertise, which further leads to judgment biases (e.g., Lin & Bier, 2008;Schrand & Zechman, 2012). In recent decades, political scientists and public administration scholars have paid substantial attention to bureaucratic power and influence, particularly in the context of budget politics, agenda control, and policy decision making (e.g., Altfeld & Miller, 1984;Bendor, Taylor, & Van Gaalen, 1985, 1987Gailmard & Patty, 2007;Makris, 2006;Niskanen, 1971;Stephenson, 2007). However, there has been little attention to bureaucrats' expertise and confidence as well as their possible relationships with policy choice.…”

Which Fox in What Henhouse and When? Conjectures on Regulatory Capture

“…In RC 1, regulators are portrayed as self‐interested and regulatory agencies that compete with others (in both the public and private sector) for resources (Becker 1983; James 2001). Regulators are interested in advancing their careers, propping up their power base, enhancing their reputation, and increasing the number of people who report and rely upon them (Aberbach and Rockman 1988; Makris 2006). Regulatory agencies seek secure support with sponsors.…”

Effects of Administrators' Aspirations, Political Principals' Priorities, and Interest Groups' Influence on State Agency Budget Requests

“…26 More recent studies also assert that political sponsors with agenda control authority or monitoring capacity can exert some influence on bureaucratic budget outcomes, chiefly in the direction of efficiency or cost reduction, if not reduced outputs. 27 In summary, legislatures have delegated power and oversight authority to control bureaucratic budget choices. In addition, the relative influence over policy and budgetary decisionmaking between bureaucratic agents and legislatures hinges, to a substantial degree, on who has informational advantages over program structures.…”