2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-1338.2008.00373.x
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Political Challenges of Innovation in the Developing World1

Abstract: In this article, we seek to rectify the absence of political analysis characterizing most literature on innovation and development. Although existing research is careful to note the lack of any single recipe or model of innovation, most scholars identify a range of institutions and policies influencing innovative performance. But such explanations beg the question of where institutions, so critical to policy implementation, actually come from. We argue that the answer lies in (1) the desire of political leader… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(21 citation statements)
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“…A poorly designed or implemented decentralization program could lead, among others, to greater fiscal deficit, inter-jurisdictional externalities and costly fiscal competition, wide disparities in service provisions and to capture of the local governments by interest groups (Tanzi, 1995;de Mello, 2000;Proud'homme, 1995;Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998;Doner et al, 2009;Hutchcroft, 2000). State capture could lead to inefficiency or worse, to corruption when local governments are granted greater powers and fiscal resources without the requisite tightening of political and administrative controls and other check-and-balance mechanisms (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999;Oates, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A poorly designed or implemented decentralization program could lead, among others, to greater fiscal deficit, inter-jurisdictional externalities and costly fiscal competition, wide disparities in service provisions and to capture of the local governments by interest groups (Tanzi, 1995;de Mello, 2000;Proud'homme, 1995;Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998;Doner et al, 2009;Hutchcroft, 2000). State capture could lead to inefficiency or worse, to corruption when local governments are granted greater powers and fiscal resources without the requisite tightening of political and administrative controls and other check-and-balance mechanisms (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999;Oates, 1999).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is the view most often used by economists, and arguments often invoke the concept of comparative advantage . The external drivers are not, however, limited to economic factors, they also include political, and more recently, also sociological and even psychological factors (Doner, Hicken, & Ritchie, 2009). After all, in a classic study on manufacturing location decisions in the United States, Mueller and Morgan (1962) discovered that by far the most common specific reason for location decisions was “personal reasons or chance,” not proximity to customers and suppliers or potential labor advantages.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For a much more sobering account of how excelling in lower level activities—even in the most “high‐technology” industries such as data storage—does not translate into successful advancement into higher value‐added activities as a result of institutional failure, see Doner et al. in this issue (Doner, Hicken & Ritchie, 2009).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%