Political corruption and money laundering: lessons from Nigeria

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to discuss political corruption in Nigeria and to assess the limitation of the immunity clause of the Nigerian constitution. This is particularly important in light of the recent developments to criminalise money-laundering in the country. Design/methodology/approach – This paper evaluates the legal anti-money laundering framework in Nigeria, in particular, the impact of the immunity clause of Nigerian constitution. Findings – Endemic corruption of the political elite leads to the abuse of the constitutional immunity clause, and significantly impairs the activities of the anti-money laundering agencies. Research limitations/implications – This paper draws on the experience of Nigeria, and is specifically looking at one obstacle on the way to fight money laundering and corruption. It is important to conduct further comparative analysis. Originality/value – This paper discusses political, economic and legal developments in Nigeria to show how the immunity clause prevents the successful prosecution of corrupt Nigerian politicians, and discusses measures taken to prevent corruption in the country.

Corporate Governance and Elites

“…This immunity is entrenched in Section 308 (Subsection 1) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution. The use (and abuse) of immunity clause is widespread in countries such as Nigeria (Markovska & Adams, 2015). Immunity 'powers' indicate that political elites are not held accountable for their actions.…”

“…On the expiration of their tenure, politicians may face prosecution, but as Markovska and Adams (2015) observed, the immunity clause gives political office holders enough time to 'clean up their acts' while in office. This system of protectionism (Markovska & Adams, 2015) ensures that politicians appoint individuals who are sympathetic to their cause. Thus, at the completion of their tenure, these appointees work for them and conceal their acts.…”

“…This relationship has attracted criticism because it fosters corruption. While Sampson (2014) argued that the patronage of religion by politicians is a tool for propaganda and political advantage, Markovska and Adams (2015) state that corrupt elites engage religion to incite the poor and illiterate masses (devotees) to achieve their selfish religious and political ambitions. The association with politicians have provided opportunities for religious leaders to take advantage of institutional voids such as failure to comply with government policies (see Ferrett, 2005).…”

Perceptions of Unrestricted Gift Giving and the Integrity of Public Servants in Nigeria

“…B. Bello & Murtala, 2015;Markovska & Adams, 2015;Szto, 2016).The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended), Fifth Schedule, Part 1 demands that public servants maintain a high standard of morality, transparency, and accountability in the conduct of government business. To this effect, Article 6(1) of the same Fifth Schedule restricts public officers from asking or accepting any property or benefit of any kind (i.e., a gift) either for themselves or any other person while discharging their duties.…”

“…The study helped to understand better the underlining contexts under which this case of cultural practice of unrestricted gift giving in the public service of a major territory in Nigeria was sustained even in the midst of the devastating effects of corruption in the public service of Nigeria as reported by A. O. Bello (2014), Global Witness (2012), Kim (2014), Markovska and Adams (2015), and Okonkwo (1992). Using a qualitative case study to review the research interest as undertaken by this study was in line with the aims and objectives of policy analysis that, according to Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), include the following: 1.…”