Political Corruption and Presidential Elections, 1929-1992

Abstract

We develop an aggregate model of the presidential vote based on the appropriation of political as well as economic information by a rational voter. We argue that, depending upon historical context, information about political corruption is relevant to individual, and hence aggregate, vote choice. In preindustrial, community-oriented machine politics, the rational voter exchanged votes for particularistic benefits. As the social and political perspective shifted to a universalistic standard, information about corruption has become for him or her one of the criteria by which to evaluate the performance of the incumbent party. By including information about corruption alongside information about the economy, our model significantly improves upon conventional economic voting models in explaining post-New Deal presidential election outcomes.

Popular Interpretations of ‘Corruption’ and their Partisan Consequences

“…The former conceptualization is by far the most prevalent in the social science literature on corruption (see, for example, Fackler and Lin, 1995;and Nye, 1989). However, as Warren (2004) and others note, a citizen's ''everyday understanding'' of corruption can certainly accommodate the notion of ''corruption-as-favoritism.''…”

“…For the most part, researchers commonly equate ''political corruption'' with lawlessness. Fackler and Lin (1995), for instance, define corruption as any of a ''variety of unlawful . .…”

It's not only the economy, stupid! Good governance matters in elections

“…information about, allegations or individual evaluations of corruption) show that its effect on vote decision and electoral outcome is small (Fackler and Lin, 1995;Hibbing and Welch, 1997;Peters and Welch, 1980) and that it is tolerated by voters as long as the economy is doing well (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013;Kla snja and Tucker, 2013;Choi and Woo, 2010). It is however debatable whether voters close their eyes to bad governance in times of economic growth.…”

Financing Elections and 'Appearance of Corruption': Citizen Attitudes and Behavior in 2012

“…Americans who believe their government is corrupt tend to attribute that corruption to the party in control of the presidency, regardless of whether a Democrat or Republican occupies the White House. 245 Hence, perceptions can systematically undercut faith in the executive. Moreover, individual candidates are more vulnerable on Election Day if they campaign during a period when Americans perceive increased government corruption.…”