2022
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102145
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Political corruption, Dodd–Frank whistleblowing, and corporate investment

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Cited by 11 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…For instance, Dimitrov et al (2015), Toscano (2020), and Huang et al (2021) show that the issuance and demand for credit ratings were significantly affected by the passage of the law. Du and Heo (2021) also show that the Dodd-Frank Act may have led to reduced corruption which affected corporate investment across US states. Most importantly, financial regulation has generally become more stringent after Dodd-Frank leaving less room for international political considerations to play a role.…”
Section: Hypothesis Development and Model Specificationmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…For instance, Dimitrov et al (2015), Toscano (2020), and Huang et al (2021) show that the issuance and demand for credit ratings were significantly affected by the passage of the law. Du and Heo (2021) also show that the Dodd-Frank Act may have led to reduced corruption which affected corporate investment across US states. Most importantly, financial regulation has generally become more stringent after Dodd-Frank leaving less room for international political considerations to play a role.…”
Section: Hypothesis Development and Model Specificationmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…D. Johnson et al, 2011) or because corruption increases the risk of expropriation (Du & Heo, 2022;Ellis et al, 2020;Murphy et al, 1993). Moreover, local corruption could lead to firms substituting investment with rent-seeking activities (Q.…”
Section: Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Huang & Yuan, 2021), our first proxy for a firm's vulnerability to corruption is the geographic dispersion of a firm. Du and Heo (2022) posit that firms that are geographically far from the state capital are less vulnerable to corruption as they are less politically visible. In contrast, firms that are geographically close to the state capital are more politically visible and thus more vulnerable to political corruption.…”
Section: Channelsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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