Political dynamics of local government reform in a development context: The case of Turkey

Abstract

This article examines the political dynamics of local government reform in Turkey during 2000s and 2010s, showing how the reform was implemented in a way that reproduced central state power. Contributing to debates on the relationship between state rescaling and decentralisation, it argues that the dynamics of electoral politics are key to determining the nature of institutional changes affecting central-local relations. In the Turkish context, decentralisation did not align with the interests of the ruling Justice and Development Party, given that opposition parties could potentially win local elections and control local municipal councils. By questioning the significance of the recent trend of decentralisation and the devolution of authority to lower levels of government in Turkey, this article contributes to the literature on the limits of decentralisation, especially in non-western contexts.

Trustees Instead of Elected Mayors: Authoritarian Neoliberalism and the Removal of Kurdish Mayors in Turkey

“…Even though AKP had to accept the results, it started to impede various activities of İstanbul Municipality. Since İmamoğlu became the mayor, “public banks have started denying loans” for their capital projects (Savaşkan 2020, 219). Another example of government obstructions of the activities of opposition mayors was seen in the case of COVID-19 pandemic.…”

“…Another example of government obstructions of the activities of opposition mayors was seen in the case of COVID-19 pandemic. Donation campaigns launched by opposition İstanbul and Ankara municipalities were banned by the government and bank accounts of the municipalities were blocked, which was justified by President Erdoğan who stated that aid campaigns can only be carried out “by entities announced by the presidency” (Savaşkan 2020, 219). These examples show that the ongoing authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey does not limit itself with undermining democratic mechanisms in Kurdish-populated cities, but it attacks all democratic mechanisms of the country, effectively getting rid of local governments.…”

“…This urban regeneration became “a vehicle for enormous wealth generation” in Turkey in relation to strong patronage networks, clientelism, and corruption (Kuyucu 2020, 27). An important part of the so-called reforms was assuring that the local governments depend on “central government for funding and decision making” (Savaşkan 2020, 206). As a result, local governments “do not have the right to set the base or rate for local taxes,” “large infrastructure projects carried out by municipalities must be approved by the central government,” and the “founding of municipal companies is contingent on the consent of the central government” (Savaşkan 2020, 212).…”

“…An important part of the so-called reforms was assuring that the local governments depend on “central government for funding and decision making” (Savaşkan 2020, 206). As a result, local governments “do not have the right to set the base or rate for local taxes,” “large infrastructure projects carried out by municipalities must be approved by the central government,” and the “founding of municipal companies is contingent on the consent of the central government” (Savaşkan 2020, 212). Local governments in Turkey lack necessary funds, and they are “dependent on funds coming from the center” (Kuyucu 2018, 19).…”

“…Even though many trustees claimed that the people were content with the “efficiency” of the public services of trustees and they frequently thank the inhabitants of the municipalities, it is difficult to assert that the ruling AKP’s candidates emerged successful from the next local elections which were held in March 2019. The results of 2019 local elections were interpreted as HDP’s consolidation of “its power in Southeast Turkey” (Savaşkan 2020, 218), and it was argued that the results show that “HDP retains its strong control over the heavily Kurdish populated provinces despite the strong government crackdown” (Esen and Gumuscu 2019, 15).…”