Political economy of eastern enlargement of the European Union: Budgetary costs and reforms in voting rules

Kandoğan, Yener

doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(00)00021-5

Cited by 22 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…All of these papers assume that the current practices of the EU budget sharing apply after the eastern enlargement and so are in line with the 'needs' view. The 'power' view studies include Baldwin et al (1997Baldwin et al ( , 2000Baldwin et al ( , 2001, and Kandogan (2000). Kandogan (2000) develops a tailored game theoretic model of the EU's budgetary decision-making process, and his data does include an enlargement (and thus variation in the SSIs), but it is missing observations for 1986 -90, 1992 and 1995.…”

Section: Earlier Studies Of Eu Budget Determinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both?

Kauppi

Widgrén

2004

Economic Policy

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"This paper examines the determinants of power in the Council of the European Union. It argues that quantitative power indices stemming from voting theory provide a good description of the actual distribution of power among EU members. Of course, we cannot directly verify the accuracy of such indices since it is impossible to measure power directly. Instead, we evaluate whether these power measures explain a quantifiable manifestation of the exercise of power, namely members' shares of EU budget allocation. As an alternative explanation of the EU budget, we also consider a 'needs view' of the budget, where members' allocations are determined by principles of solidarity. Our empirical analysis is based on 1976-2001 data on the patterns of the EU budget shares and on measures of each member state's needs and political power. Our results indicate that at least 60% of the budget expenditures can be attributed to selfish power politics and the remaining 40% to the declared benevolent EU budget policies. However, when we apply specific voting power measures that allow correlated preferences and cooperative voting patterns between the member states, our estimates indicate that the power politics view can explain as much as 90% of the budget shares. We conclude that power politics can explain a major part of the Council decisions and that correlated preferences and voting cooperation between EU countries potentially play significant roles in EU decision making." Copyright � Blackwell Publishing 2004.

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Section: Earlier Studies Of Eu Budget Determinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both?

Kauppi

Widgrén

2004

Economic Policy

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“…Candidates in the Eastern enlargement are smaller than the EU average. Before Nice, this created concerns for incumbent members, especially large ones, which feared too much loss of power to small eastern countries and the potential implications for the costs of enlargement as mentioned in Kandogan (2000).…”

Section: Widening the Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The fact that the applicant countries were not part of the negotiations in Nice when the new voting weights were decided makes this observation interesting. Kandogan (2000) analyses the relation between voting power and budgetary costs of enlargements. He finds that a country's voting power and the power of the coalition it is part of are critical in explaining its receipts from the EU budget.…”

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confidence: 99%

Power analysis of the Nice Treaty on the future of European integration

Kandoğan¹

2005

Applied Economics

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Power analysis of changes in voting weights and rules in the Nice Treaty is done by applying methods that use Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Significant decreases in voting power of small countries make widening of integration more acceptable to incumbent members due to small size of the applicants. Relative increases in the conciliatory power of smaller members, and relative increases in the independent power of bigger members make smaller members compromise more, and improve the position of large members for further deepening of the integration. Lastly, the fairness analysis reveals a more federalist EU in the way votes are distributed.

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“…The early discussions about institutional reform in the event of Eastern enlargement also revealed fears concerning the dissimilarity between current and future members of the EU. This (dis-)similarity is based on the fact that from today's perspective the accession of all applicants would increase the EU population by around 30% but its GDP by only 4% (Baldwin et a!., 1997;Kandogan, 2000).…”

Section: Policy Positions Of Old and New Member States In Agriculturamentioning

confidence: 99%