Political Institutions and Conservation by Local Governments

Abstract

In this article, the authors develop a political market framework to explain the circumstances under which Florida counties will supply environmental public goods in the form of conservation amendments to county general plans. The framework emphasizes the role of local legislative and executive institutions as mediators of local policy change. Using count models and interaction terms, the analysis shows how the strength of real estate interests constrains the ability of professional county managers to pursue conservation policies. The findings reinforce the importance of developing theories of urban politics in which local political institutions are not transparent.

Selection and Passage of County Land Preservation Voter Referendum: The Role of Government

“…Pro-development and environmental interests feature important differences in their geographic basis of organization (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez, 2005). A political science analysis portrays environmental interests as a diffuse, unorganized constituency that favors some general form of environmental protection.…”

“…This perspective is linked to Tiebout (1956) models, which often argue that communities have an optimum size for delivery of local public goods. In general, the property rights framework predicts conservation amendments and/or voter referendums will become more frequent as land becomes scarce, population increases, and infrastructure becomes strained (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez, 2005).…”

“…These groups are often main players in "not-in-my-backyard" politics and include neighborhood organizations, homeowners associations, and citizen activists located within geographically defined constituencies. These geographic groups often dominate the politics of land use, as they resist unwanted land uses such as major roads, or clamor for improved environmental amenities like parks and preservation areas (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez, 2005).…”

“…Economic and development interests have a substantial concern for county government land use decisions because of consequences for return on their investments and production activities (Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez, 2005).…”

“…Lubell, Feiock and Ramirez (2005) developed a political market framework to empirically explain the circumstances under which Florida counties would supply environmental goods in the form of conservation amendments to county general plans. Their findings reinforce the importance of developing theories of urban politics in which local political institutions are not transparent.…”