Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships

Abstract

Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by diminishing the risk of coups? We posit that the effectiveness of political institutions in deterring coups crucially depends on the types of plotters and their political goals. By providing a means to address the ruling coalition’s primary concerns about a dictator’s opportunism or incompetence, institutions reduce the necessity of reshuffling coups, in which the ruling coalition replaces an incumbent leader but keeps the regime intact. However, such institutions do not diminish the risk of regime-changing coups, because the plotters’ goals of overthrowing the entire regime and changing the group of ruling coalition are not achievable via activities within the institutions. Our empirical analysis provides strong empirical support for our expectations. Our findings highlight that the role of “democratic” institutions in deterring coups is rather limited as it only applies to less than 38% of coup attempts.

Explaining Activity in Authoritarian Assemblies: Evidence from China

“…As the results of this study show, even among delegates who would all be considered regime insiders, I find considerable differences in their interests and actions. Thus, in order to understand the political dynamics of authoritarian regimes and institutions better, we need to apply a more fine-grained approach as recent studies on intra-elite bargaining have shown (Kim and Sudduth 2021; Noble 2020; Lü, Liu, and Li 2020). On the other hand, this also means that institutions may serve the regime in more than just one purpose.…”

“…In contrast to aggregating delegates into categories of regime insiders and outsiders, I argue that it is primarily their position in the authoritarian regime and hierarchy that predicts their levels of activity in an authoritarian assembly. While even in authoritarian regimes actors have many competing and divergent preferences (Williamson and Magaloni 2020; Kim and Sudduth 2021), their ability to ultimately influence policymaking varies. Just as in democracies (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007), some actors in authoritarian regimes are more powerful than others regarding policymaking and agenda-setting and can bypass legislative bargaining more easily (Wu 2020; Schuler 2021).…”

“…The main contributions of this article to the literature on comparative authoritarianism are twofold. First, it contributes to the increasing understanding that even in dictatorships many actors have different and even conflicting interests (e.g., Kim and Sudduth 2021). In the case of this article, for instance, government officials have different motives depending on the administrative level they work on.…”

Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations

“…The resulting power struggles within regimes may result in two very different equilibrium outcomes (Svolik, 2009). In some regimes, dictators institutionalize power-sharing mechanisms that give regime elites access to decision making and rents in predictable ways, regulate succession rules, and co-opt opposition groups (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012; Meng, 2020; Kim & Sudduth, 2021). Institutions may thus reduce elites’ incentives to risk a (regime change) coup, 1 even while enhancing their capacity to constrain the leader by credibly threatening (and sometimes executing) leader reshuffling coups.…”

Don’t turn around, der Kommissar’s in town: Political officers and coups d’état in authoritarian regimes

“… 8 For additional description of the differences between reshuffle and regime change coups, see Kim & Sudduth (2021). …”