Political Institutions and Governability from FHC to Lula

Santos, Fabiano; Vilarouca, Márcio Grijó

doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wr9x1.9

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…(Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000: 167) This camp argues that voluntary consultations on the monthly agenda between chamber presidents and a committee of party leaders (the Colegio) effectively creates a parliamentary process with agenda power centralized in the hands of party leaders (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000). Party control over committee appointments facilitates control over amendments, and powers to cast symbolic votes on behalf of their delegations and to request roll calls facilitate control over voting (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000;Lyne, 2008;Santos and Vilarouca, 2008). The result is high levels of legislative party unity as evidenced by the high values of party Rice across party delegations (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000;Lyne, 2008;Santos and Vilarouca, 2008).…”

Section: Legislative Party Strength In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studying legislative party politics in data scarce environments

Yadav

2016

Party Politics

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Efforts to study the dynamics of legislative and party politics in developing countries often confront a serious obstacle – lack of public data on legislative actions. This paper proposes a new feasible approach for obtaining legislative information indirectly – analyzing the perceptions and lobbying behaviors of business interest groups who are experienced, knowledgeable and highly invested in staying informed on policymaking processes. I build on extant literatures on political parties and lobbying to show how we can systematically exploit group insights to study legislative parties in data-scarce environments and complement existing approaches in data-rich cases. I then demonstrate and evaluate this approach by using original data from a 2006 survey of 158 groups in a data-rich case, Brazil, to mediate existing scholarly debates regarding the sources of legislative unity of Brazilian parties.

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Section: Legislative Party Strength In Brazilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Studying legislative party politics in data scarce environments

Yadav

2016

Party Politics

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“…16 As well as the patrimonial and authoritarian practices of politicians inherited from the military regime, if not earlier (Marks, 1993). 17 The institutional disincentives are detailed by Power and Ames (2010); Power (2010), Amorim Neto (2002); Armijo, Faucher and Dembinska, (2006); Cintra (2007); and Santos and Vilarouca (2008). The effective number of parties in the Congress was 8.2 in 1994 and 7.1 in 1998, and volatility from 1994 to 1998 was 25 percent (Kinzo, 2004: 32.…”

Section: Period 2: the Neoliberal Cleavagementioning

confidence: 99%

Federalism and Democratic Reform in China with Lessons from India

Davis¹

2014

JJPP

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The Chinese political fabric appears to be under great stress, with reports of nearly 200,000 “mass incidents” every year, especially from workers with labor disputes and ordinary people whose property is often seized by corrupt officials. Such incidents are fuelled by public dissatisfaction nationwide as well as the disenchantment of Chinese State policies among ethnic groups, who occupy at least a third of Chinese territory. China has so far been able to keep its peripheral communities under control (or in the case of Taiwan, to ensure a degree of restraint) through its clear willingness to use force, which has aggravated the unease. A democratic China, however, would find it difficult to adopt such a repressive posture. Drawing on Linz and Stepan and Yadav’s theoretical and empirical elaboration, the article examines the characteristics of Chinese federalism and the lessons that can be learnt from a large multinational state like India. The article suggests a dual mechanism of federalism on the Chinese mainland and confederation with peripheral communities for addressing China’s territorial and political development. A confederal arrangement for China’s peripheral communities would provide a reliable umbrella of national laws and institutions under which these communities could be brought together in the “statenation” vision. The viability of such an arrangement hinges on the presence of a strong judiciary for third-party dispute resolution and for implementing confederal agreements

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“…This is not an exhaustive list of the issues involved in reforma política, which the Brazilian political class has been debating for two decades. Reformers have argued for various rule changes with a view to improving accountability, strengthening party organizations, and improving transparency (for arguments that many of the proposed rule changes are unnecessary, see Cheibub 2009;Santos and Vilarouca 2008). Similarly to the pattern observed with regard to corruption control, politicians have been notoriously reluctant to regulate themselves.…”

Section: Political Reformmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brazilian Democracy as a Late Bloomer: Reevaluating the Regime in the Cardoso-Lula Era

Power¹

2010

Latin American Research Review

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This article reviews the state of Brazilian democracy at the close of the Cardoso-Lula era. Brazil has now completed a quarter century of competitive politics, the longest democratic period in the country's history. Although evaluations of the regime's prospects were often pessimistic in the 1985-1993 period, the performance of democracy improved markedly after the Plano Real stabilization plan in the mid-1990s, which was followed by signifi cant policy achievements under presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, or PSDB) and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Workers' Party, or PT). Since 1995, the axis of national politics has turned on the competition between the PSDB and allies versus the PT and allies. Under this emerging bicoalitional architecture, several key policy domains have been objects of consensus between the two camps, which has led to major policy advances; however, certain policy areas remain outside the zone of consensus and pose enduring challenges. Despite the improving quality of democracy, the mass public continues to display a surprisingly high level of indifference to the regime type.After twenty-one years of military dictatorship, Brazil became a political democracy on March 15, 1985. 1 As the age of democracy passes the quarter century mark, interpretations of the regime are noticeably more positive than they were in the early posttransition years. In the late 1980s , and several anonymous reviewers for comments on an earlier draft of this article.

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Political Institutions and Governability from FHC to Lula

Cited by 13 publications

References 0 publications

Studying legislative party politics in data scarce environments

Studying legislative party politics in data scarce environments

Federalism and Democratic Reform in China with Lessons from India

Brazilian Democracy as a Late Bloomer: Reevaluating the Regime in the Cardoso-Lula Era

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