Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America

Scartascini, Carlos; Tommasi, Mariano; Machado, Fabiana

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1815945

Cited by 51 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Scartascini and Tommasi (2012) argue that citizens choose between institutionalized and non-institutionalized political actions based on their perceived effectiveness. For instance, Machado et al (2011) show that where institutions are strong, actors are likely to participate in the political process through institutionalized arenas. But when institutions are weak, actors are more likely to resort to protests and other unconventional means of participation.…”

Section: Corruption and Education In Democraciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics

Agerberg

2018

Polit Behav

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Education has consistently been found to be positively related to political participation, electoral turnout, civic engagement, political knowledge, and democratic attitudes and opinions. Previous research has, however, not sufficiently acknowledged the large existing between-and within-country variations in institutional quality when studying this relationship. This study asks the question: how do highly educated, well-informed, and critical citizens react to a political system with low-quality institutions; a system with high levels of corruption? Researchers have in recent years started to acknowledge corruption as a relevant factor in explaining democratic attitudes and behavior. However, how corruption interacts with individual characteristics in shaping political behavior is largely unexplored in the literature. This paper focuses on the interaction between corruption and education with regard to different political attitudes and democratic behavior. Using both individual-and country-level data from 31 democracies the results show that corruption thwarts many of the positive effects of education with regard to politics: The results indicate that when corruption is high, educated and politically sophisticated citizens are as likely as low-educated citizens to feel resignation with regard to formal political institutions. This, in turn, is likely to affect patterns of political participation among these citizens.

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Section: Corruption and Education In Democraciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, they choose a mode of participation that they perceive to be effective (Scartascini and Tommasi 2012). Under weak and corrupt institutions, this means de-emphasizing formal political participation and resorting to more unconventional, non-institutionalized means of participation (Machado et al 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics

Agerberg

2018

Polit Behav

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“…26 Hyde and Marinov 2012. 27 Carey 2006;Davis and Ward 1990;Gupta, Singh, and Sprague 1993;Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi 2011;Moore 1998;Moore 2000. governments tend to respond to domestic threats such as protests with repression and that they are more likely to apply censorship and political restrictions as the frequency and intensity of dissent rises. 28 Sabine Carey, however, found that only guerrilla warfare increases the risk of political repression, whereas non-violent or spontaneous forms of dissent do not create threats substantial enough to warrant a violent government response.…”

Section: Protest and Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

Hafner-Burton

Hyde²,

Jablonski

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

304

173

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When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre-and post-election periods? Our central argument is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decisionmaking powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats, and a central purpose of our research is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of our argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre-and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.2 When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? 1 On paper, Azerbaijan is a multiparty democracy, and has held periodic multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since the country regained independence in 1991. Despite the nominal existence of democratic institutions, tactics of electoral manipulation used by the government include overt election fraud, violence, and intimidation. Opposition supporters, opposition candidates, and journalists risk torture, arbitrary arrest, and political imprisonment-all strategies the government uses to "win" elections. 2 For example, in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, facing the possibility that the "colour revolutions" of Georgia and Ukraine would spread, the government arrested journalists and attempted to prevent the opposition from campaigning.The police detained over a thousand activists before the election, and jailed hundreds without cause. 3 After the election, amid accusations of fraud, the government announced that the ruling party won an overwhelming majority, 4 Opposition supporters began to protest the results, assembling more than 7,000 people. Riot police and military forces disbursed the protesters using clubs and water cannons, and several opposition politicians were beaten. 5 In the end, despite international and domestic backlash, the incumbent remained in power. 6 Government-sponsored election violence-events in which incumbent leaders and ruling party agents employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during, or after elections-is common. 4(including threats of violence such as harassment), we present and test a theory of when an incumbent government is likely to use election violence prior to or after an election. Our central argument is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious t...

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“…Similarly, Machado, Scartascini, and Tommasi (2011) examine institutional strength to explain the prevalence of protests. They study seventeen Latin American countries using LAPOP individual survey data finding that "unconventional forms of political participation tend to be chosen more often where institutions are of lower quality" (342).…”

Section: Quality Of Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vamos Para Rua! Taking to the Streets Protest in Brazil

Valente

Holmes

2017

BJBS

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The unprecedented protests that unfolded in the month of June 2013 surprised even the most observant Brazilian scholars. In the streets of all major cities in Brazil, one could hear thousands chanting, Vamos para Rua! or "Let's take it to the streets." A local conflict over the increase of public transportation fare took an unexpected turn and ignited a massive nationwide protest. These protests have perplexed many because Brazil was not experiencing the context of economic or political instabilities that are common to countries around the world, where massive, violent protests have emerged as consequence of such instabilitiesfor instance, the crises that have developed both in Europe and in the Arab world in recent times. In Brazil, however, the contemporary protests do not appear to be linked to the contexts typically associated with Latin American protests: economic depression, unemployment, inflation, economic liberalization, privatization efforts, or a breakdown of the party system. Thus, we turn to a different theoretical framework, post-materialism, to understand Brazil's contemporary protests.The many posters displayed by protesters during their manifestations on the streets in 2013 seemed to indicate that the movement constituted an uprising antagonizing the political elite and Brazilian policymakers. Backed in its majority by members of the middle class, the protests attracted attention to issues ranging from poor public services, including transportation, healthcare, and education, to the way government budget is drained by the inefficient public machinery and widespread corruption. To make matters worse, as Brazil was preparing to host the two most important sportive events in the world (the World Cup, in 2014, and the Olympics, in 2016), more and more of these problems have come to surface.After having caused an unprecedented expenditure of public money, most of the infrastructure required by FIFA as preparation for the World Cup was not delivered. This culminated in a generalized dissatisfaction demonstrated on the streets and in the rapid decent of the approval rate of the current government. The rallying cry of protesters advocating for public hospitals and public schools "according to the FIFA standard" echoed around the world in an unforeseen manner. This current state of dissatisfaction has only Background Context

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Political Institutions and Street Protests in Latin America

Cited by 51 publications

References 26 publications

The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics

The Curse of Knowledge? Education, Corruption, and Politics

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

Vamos Para Rua! Taking to the Streets Protest in Brazil

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