Political Legitimacy of Vietnam's One PartyState: Challenges and Responses

Thayer, Carlyle A.

doi:10.1177/186810340902800403

Cited by 65 publications

(55 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Most recently, many well-known leaders, including 99-year-old war hero General Vo Nguyen Giap, have publicly protested the decision to allow a Chinese mining company to exploit a bauxite mine-a public display of intra-elite dissent that has challenged the VCP's "performance legitimacy" (Thayer 2009). Internal dissent, although officially frowned on, is quite common and occasionally spills into the public sphere.…”

Section: Background On the Vietnamese Legislaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

2010

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R ecent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.

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Section: Background On the Vietnamese Legislaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

2010

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“…Public Profiles inChina (2011), News Stories About Provincial Leaders in Vietnam (2007-2010 Note: The index data for China reported here comes from Baidu and is reported in absolute term. Values can be interpreted as the average number of searches or media mentions for each candidate during any given day in the year 2011 throughout the entire country.…”

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confidence: 99%

Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy

Gueorguiev¹,

Schüler²

2016

J East Asian Stud

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During recent party congresses in China and Vietnam, two highly anticipated candidates for promotion were sidelined. In China, Bo Xilai was arrested for corruption and stripped of his party membership. In Vietnam, Nguyen Ba Thanh remained a provincial leader with little opportunity for promotion to the Politburo. Existing arguments about promotions under authoritarian rule are unable to explain these outcomes. In particular, both candidates were competent and well connected. This cuts contrary to the expectations of both performance-based promotion and factional promotion theories. We argue that these candidates were sidelined due to a previously undertheorized factor in promotion contests-their ability to mobilize personal followings. Amidst a literature that has focused almost exclusively on intra-elite conflict, we argue that elite-mass linkages are critical. In particular, the public profile of top leaders is important for regime legitimacy and mobilization. However, when individuals become exceptionally well known they become threats to the single-party system. We test this argument on promotions in China's 18th Party Congress in 2012 and Vietnam's 11th Party Congress in 2011, using original data on Internet search queries and media coverage among contenders for promotion. Our approach offers new insights into the strategies authoritarian politicians use to stay afloat as well as the mistakes that sink them when competing for power under one-party rule.The study of elite politics under single-party rule offers insights into the strengths and frailties of a system that is, by design, intended to be non-competitive. Yet, as the contributions to this special issue demonstrate, the interplay between elites and their networks (factions) is anything but non-competitive. In the absence of elections, the contest of ambitions is most clearly visible in the realm of promotions, which, despite significant efforts at meritocratic institutionalization, remains intensely sensitive to internal contests between regime elites. In the case of China, studies of promotion reveal that factional affiliations play an important role in the party's internal balance of power, which, were it not for party norms and rituals, could spill over into visible internal splits.This article contributes by bringing attention to an omission in the existing discussion of elite authoritarian politics. Most work on elite promotions, including the other contributions to this special issue, sets aside societal connections to focus exclusively on intraelite conflicts, which given the lack of direct electoral connection, makes some sense. At the same time, we contend that what makes promotion so salient is the fact that internal

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“…The VCP obviously plays an important role in all aspects of state management as VCP members occupy key positions in organizations of the state apparatus (Thayer, 2008(Thayer, , 2009 and are expected to follow party resolutions which, as Malesky et al (forthcoming) note, serve as the framework for national policy choices. Abuza (1998) argues that Vietnam's political system is based upon the patron-client system in which junior officials will implement policies supported by their patrons.…”

Section: Governmental Structure and Budgeting Environmentmentioning

confidence: 97%

An Analysis of Quasi-Decentralized Budgeting in Vietnam

Nguyen‐Hoang¹,

Schroeder

2010

International Journal of Public Administration

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This article provides an analysis of the quasi-decentralized budgeting process used in Vietnam as defined in the 2002 Law on the State Budget. Although the Government is controlled by a single political party and relies on a single state budget, the Law grants provinces considerable decentralized power over allocation of tax revenues and expenditure responsibilities within their own jurisdictions. The article documents the effects of various aspects of the Law on the revenues and spending of sub-national governments in the country and illustrates how various provinces have responded to the decentralized powers granted under the Law.

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Political Legitimacy of Vietnam's One PartyState: Challenges and Responses

Cited by 65 publications

References 5 publications

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament

Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy

An Analysis of Quasi-Decentralized Budgeting in Vietnam

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