Political Liberties and Social Equality

Abstract

This paper examines the link between political liberties and social equality, and contends that the former are constitutive of, i.e. necessary to secure, the latter. Although this constitutive link is often assumed in the literature on political liberties, the reasons why it holds true remain largely unexplored. Three such reasons are examined here. First, political liberties are constitutive of social equality because they bestow political power on their holders, leaving disenfranchised individuals excluded from decisions that are particularly pervasive, coercively enforced, hard to avoid, monopolistic, and final. Second, they are constitutive of social equality due to their positional value, such that those who are denied such liberties are socially downgraded because and to the extent that others enjoy them. Third, they are constitutive of social equality due to their expressive value, in the sense that, by disenfranchising some individuals, the state publicly fails to recognize their equal moral agency. While unpacking these reasons, we address some criticisms of this constitutive link recently raised by Steven Wall and Jason Brennan.* Previous versions of the paper were presented in Oxford, Zurich, Mexico City, and Barcelona. We are grateful to those audiences and, for written comments, to

The ballot and the wallet: Self‐respect and the fair value of political liberties

“…For, as Meena Krishnamurthy (2013: 183) argues, having a capacity for a conception of the good comprises having a capacity for a conception of the public good, a view of how society should be arranged. iv On the expressive power of state action, and its effects on social status in particular, see Schemmel (2012), González-Ricoy andQueralt (2018), andVoigt (2018). v We thank Andrew Williams for comments on this.…”

“…vi We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. vii On some of these features, see Morris (2012), Kolodny (2014), Cordelli (2017), andGonzález-Ricoy andQueralt (2018). viii We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern.…”

“…4 4 On the expressive power of state action, and its effects on social status in particular, see Schemmel (2012), González‐Ricoy and Queralt (2018), and Voigt (2018). …”

“…7 7 On some of these features, see Morris (2012), Kolodny (2014), Cordelli (2017), and González‐Ricoy and Queralt (2018). …”

Real self-respect and its social bases

“…What the example is supposed to show is that the social bases of robust and correct standing self-respect are specific, and not co-extensive with social justice overall, or even with all those requirements of justice that are particularly apt to express people’s equal worth as agents - as equal political rights are (Cohen 2002, 110; Gonzalez Ricoy and Queralt Lange 2018, 19ff; Schemmel 2012, 141). These social bases consist of the motivational and epistemic resources to arrive at, and retain, correct convictions of their own worth, even under injustice.…”