2021
DOI: 10.1111/padm.12760
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Political opportunism and transaction costs in contractual choice of public–private partnerships

Abstract: The New Public Management (NPM) has achieved many successes in public service delivery, but practitioners frequently observed failures in developing and transitional economies. For instance, China's public–private partnerships (PPP) since 2014 have failed to transfer risks to the private sector, to involve private skills and expertise, and to reduce local government's debt. This article claims that PPP failures in China are associated with the contractual type of nonconcessions and the contractual choice is in… Show more

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Cited by 24 publications
(17 citation statements)
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References 65 publications
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“…Wang et al, 2020). Local officials also seek to increase the number of PPP projects (especially projects of nonconcessions that rely on local government payments), which exceeds local fiscal capacity and results in increasing debt risks (Xiong et al, 2022).…”
Section: Analytic Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Wang et al, 2020). Local officials also seek to increase the number of PPP projects (especially projects of nonconcessions that rely on local government payments), which exceeds local fiscal capacity and results in increasing debt risks (Xiong et al, 2022).…”
Section: Analytic Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Local officials pursue political achievements, such as large PPP projects, to create highly visible performance even in illegal ways that increase local government debt (F. Wang et al, 2020). Local officials also seek to increase the number of PPP projects (especially projects of nonconcessions that rely on local government payments), which exceeds local fiscal capacity and results in increasing debt risks (Xiong et al, 2022).…”
Section: Analytic Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, there are reasons to be skeptical about whether the public sector's ceding control rights are conducive to the project's overall goals. Highly specific investments may cause the hold‐up problem that is manifested as extortion by private parties against the public sector to obtain excess profits (Wang et al, 2018; Xiong et al, 2021).…”
Section: Exploratory Propositions On the Relationships Of Private Con...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides, fiscal policy (e.g. accounting treatments of PPPs) cannot restrict this phenomenon as government's payment obligation is kept off the balance sheet and lacks transparency (Xiong et al, 2021). Thus, PPPs may incur governments' hidden liabilities and impede the sustainability of urban public finance, which goes against the principle of intergenerational equity of social sustainability (Yuan et al, 2020) F26 F23 F24 F25 F19-F5 F1 Inadequate private sectors participation (B4)…”
Section: Public-private Partnershipsmentioning
confidence: 99%