Political opposition, external threats, and elite responses: analyzing domestic security policy in post-Rose Revolution Georgia

Strakes, Jason E.

doi:10.1080/14751798.2013.842710

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 7 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Iranian leaders blamed the United States and the British for engineering a color revolution or a coup by colluding with domestic out-groups that led civil-society movements, citing confessions from alleged spies about the international conspiracy. 10 In a similar example, the Georgian government's repressive tactics against organized demonstrations since the 2003 Rose Revolution resulted in part from its allegation of collusion between internal opposition and Russia (Strakes 2013).…”

Section: Domestic In-groups' Strategic Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic Political Consequences of International Rivalry

Bak

Chávez

Rider

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Given the conventional claim that external threats increase internal cohesion and government capacity, cross-country studies have examined how interstate conflict events influence domestic politics. This article reevaluates the in-group and out-group mechanisms by examining how international strategic rivalry, which indicates the presence of persistent external threats even in the absence of military conflict, affects domestic political competition. An alternative explanation suggests that the effect of external threats on political incentives of domestic actors differs between regime supporters and oppositions. We posit that the presence of international threats from rival states inflames domestic unrest and oppositions’ antiregime challenges, while making governments rely more on repressive tactics given resource constraints and a high level of domestic political intolerance. In addition, we propose that the domestic consequences of international rivalry are heterogeneous depending on the characteristics of political systems and the level of threat perception. Empirical tests reveal robust evidence for the hypotheses.

show abstract

Section: Domestic In-groups' Strategic Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Domestic Political Consequences of International Rivalry

Bak

Chávez

Rider

2019

Journal of Conflict Resolution

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…An immediate goal of reform was to fight corruption and crime in the country. In late 2005 and early 2006, the UNM declared a policy of 'zero tolerance' that involved significant change to the criminal justice system (Slade 2012;Strakes 2013;Kupatadze 2016).…”

Section: Legal Nihilism and Zero Tolerancementioning

confidence: 99%

Popular Punitiveness? Punishment and Attitudes to Law in Post-Soviet Georgia

Slade

Kupatadze

2017

Europe-Asia Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Georgia is the only country in the post-Soviet region where incarceration rates significantly grew in the 2000s. In 2013, the prison population was halved through a mass amnesty. Did this punitiveness and its sudden relaxation after 2012 impact attitudes to the law? We find that these attitudes remained negative regardless of levels of punitiveness. Furthermore, the outcomes of sentencing may be less important than procedures leading to sentencing. Procedural justice during both punitiveness and liberalisation was not assured. This may explain the persistence of negative attitudes to law. The Georgian case shows that politically-driven punitive turns or mass amnesties are unlikely to solve the problem of legal nihilism in the region.

show abstract