Political Participation, Clientelism, and Targeting of Local Government Programs

Abstract

This paper provides evidence concerning political participation (turnout, awareness, attendance at meetings, campaign involvement, voting) and its relation to local governance in a developing country, based on a rural household survey in West Bengal, India. With the exception of education and immigrant status, we find that reported participation rates varied remarkably little with socioeconomic status. Within villages, benefits disbursed by local governments displayed no relation to wealth, caste, education, gender or political affiliations. In contrast, allocation of benefits across villages by higher-level governments displayed bias against poor and low caste groups; these biases were larger in villages with more unequal landownership and lower participation rates in village meetings. Political support among voters for the dominant Left party was positively correlated with receipt of recurring benefits and help provided by local governments in times of personal need, but not long-term one-time benefits or local public goods provided.

Local Institutional Structure and Clientelistic Access to Employment: The Case of MGNREGS in Three States of India

“…Suppose that politician-lenders can earn an amount ρ by investing 1 unit outside the rural sector. We assume that opportunity cost of capital for politician-lender is higher than that for rural moneylenders, that is, ρ ≥ p e r 13 . Letρ be the upper bound of ρ, thus ρ ∈ [p e r,ρ].…”

“…Clients, however, receive only short term gains at the cost of long-run development. Moreover private transfers, which are inherently discretionary (rather than programmatic) create horizontal inequity and impede collective action by the poor which in turn reinforces the stability of clientelistic distortion [13].…”

Does Political Activism and Affiliation Affect Allocation of Benefits in the Rural Employment Guarantee Program: Evidence from West Bengal, India

“…For example, Banerjee (2007) presents a vivid picture of village politics prevalent in West Bengal through an ethnographic study, where she finds that public resources often remain in the hands of the politically well-connected individuals. Apart from this, Bardhan, Mitra, Mookherjee, and Sarkar (2008) find evidence that Left-leaning voters are significantly and positively associated with receipt of benefits from welfare programs. Sarkar (2006) and (2010) argue that individuals in West Bengal depended on informal benefits and security from the Left Front parties in exchange of their votes, which had been the cause of the unexpected political stability in the state.…”

Infrastructures éducatives et achèvement des études en contexte camerounais de décentralisation

“…Faute d’économies d’échelle et en vertu de la duplication des centres de décision, elle peut conduire à une allocation plus efficace des ressources. De même, si la gouvernance locale participative permet un contrôle plus vigilant des décisionnaires locaux, elle peut également conduire à la capture du pouvoir local par certains groupes d'intérêt dont le pouvoir est accru localement (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 1999). Également, la multiplicité des centres de décisions va entraîner des problèmes de recrutement des ressources humaines compétentes pour mettre en œuvre les nouvelles politiques éducatives dont elles ont désormais la charge.…”