Political Parties in Burundi: Identity and Organizational Cohesion

Exploring Post-Rebel Parties in Power: Political Space and Implications for Islamist Inclusion and Moderation

“…Thus, the CNDD-FDD controlled the security apparatus and state resources, and despite the signing of a peace agreement, the distribution of power and patronage along ethnic (Hutu/Tutsi) lines, i.e., the issue which had led to the eruption of the war and garnered support for the post-rebel party during the period of conflict, remained salient. Hence, the CNDD-FDD emerged from the war in a strong position vis-à-vis its political opponents, yet the party was not in a position to eradicate its rivals on the party scene as a number of these controlled their own armed militias and had significant as well as stable roots in society, although they were poorly organized (Tobolka, 2014;Wittig, 2016). Consequently, the CNDD-FDD conceded a sizeable seat share in the legislature to opposition parties and entered into a power-sharing arrangement in line with the Arusha agreement, although the CNDD-FDD was firmly in the driving seat (Reyntjens, 1993(Reyntjens, , 2009Wittig, 2016) 11 .…”

“…Consequently, the CNDD-FDD conceded a sizeable seat share in the legislature to opposition parties and entered into a power-sharing arrangement in line with the Arusha agreement, although the CNDD-FDD was firmly in the driving seat (Reyntjens, 1993(Reyntjens, , 2009Wittig, 2016) 11 . Five years later, at the time of the second post-conflict election in 2010, the CNDD-FDD had cemented its position in power, capitalizing on intra-elite competition and fragmentation of the party system, particularly amongst the Hutu segment and, some say, as a consequence of electoral fraud and manipulation as the international community had become less preoccupied with Burundian affairs (Reyntjens, 2006;Tobolka, 2014). Since the conflict's end in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has thus gradually bolstered its reign by effectively setting up an extensive clientelistic network, thus creating a party-state merger, coupled with harsh repression of any form of opposition-whether ethnic, internal or external-including via the manipulation of legislation with the purpose of interfering with internal party matters of its rivals (Jones & Wittig, 2016;Lemarchand, 2009;Tobolka, 2014;Wittig, 2016).…”

“…Five years later, at the time of the second post-conflict election in 2010, the CNDD-FDD had cemented its position in power, capitalizing on intra-elite competition and fragmentation of the party system, particularly amongst the Hutu segment and, some say, as a consequence of electoral fraud and manipulation as the international community had become less preoccupied with Burundian affairs (Reyntjens, 2006;Tobolka, 2014). Since the conflict's end in 2005, the CNDD-FDD has thus gradually bolstered its reign by effectively setting up an extensive clientelistic network, thus creating a party-state merger, coupled with harsh repression of any form of opposition-whether ethnic, internal or external-including via the manipulation of legislation with the purpose of interfering with internal party matters of its rivals (Jones & Wittig, 2016;Lemarchand, 2009;Tobolka, 2014;Wittig, 2016). In other words, the party used the 11 It is worth noting that in many instances, power sharing in the form of coalition government means very little in terms of actually sharing power.…”