Political realism as ideology critique

Abstract

a School of Politics, Philosophy, language and Communication Studies, University of east anglia, norwich, UK; b faculteit der Maatschappij-en Gedragswetenschappen, Universiteit van amsterdam, amsterdam, the netherlands ABSTRACT This paper outlines an account of political realism as a form of ideology critique. We defend the normative edge of this critical-theoretic project against the common charge that there is a problematic trade-off between a theory's groundedness in facts about the political status quo and its ability to envisage radical departures from the status quo. To overcome that problem, we combine insights from theories of legitimacy by Bernard Williams and other realists, Critical Theory, and analytic epistemological and metaphysical theories of cognitive bias, ideology and social construction. The upshot is an account of realism as empirically informed critique of social and political phenomena. We reject a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory, and so provide an alternative to the anti-empiricism of some approaches to Critical Theory as well as to the complacency towards existing power structures found within liberal realism, let alone mainstream normative political philosophy, liberal or otherwise.

Being Realistic and Demanding the Impossible

“…For instance, in recent works we read that realism can lead to a "collapsing of the space for serious challenges to major social and political institutions (Markell, 2010, p. 176), that "the closer political theorists are to politics the more their own judgment and frailties will be tested" (Philp, 2012, p. 646), and that "realism will inevitably tend to nudge us towards a greater acceptance of the status quo, towards more modesty in the change that we are prepared to propose or demand" (Finlayson, 2017, p. 271). In this article I resist those claims, and contribute to the project of reclaiming the radical potential of political realism (Brinn, 2019;Cross, 2019;Honig & Stears, 2011;McKean, 2016;McQueen, 2016;Prinz, 2016;Raekstad, 2016;Prinz & Rossi, 2017). I develop a form of realism as genealogy-both debunking and vindicatory-and show how it can be more radical than both ideal and nonideal approaches to normative political theory.…”

“…One may not find that account of ideological distortion persuasive, but radical-minded realists must have one in order to make good the idea that there is more to legitimacy than a belief in it. And, importantly, the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable legitimation stories is not moral but epistemic: ideological legitimation stories just aren't what they purport to be, so epistemic caution requires us to disregard them, as we will see in 3.2 below (Prinz & Rossi, 2017 (Mills, 2005).…”

Being realistic and demanding the impossible

“…For instance, in recent works we read that realism can lead to a “collapsing of the space for serious challenges to major social and political institutions (Markell, , p. 176), that “the closer political theorists are to politics the more their own judgment and frailties will be tested” (Philp, , p. 646), and that “realism will inevitably tend to nudge us towards a greater acceptance of the status quo, towards more modesty in the change that we are prepared to propose or demand” (Finlayson, , p. 271). In this article I resist those claims, and contribute to the project of reclaiming the radical potential of political realism (Brinn, ; Cross, ; Honig & Stears, ; McKean, ; McQueen, ; Prinz, ; Raekstad, ; Prinz & Rossi, ). I develop a form of realism as genealogy–both debunking and vindicatory–and show how it can be more radical than both ideal and nonideal approaches to normative political theory.…”

From Moral Principles to Political Judgments: The Case for Pragmatic Idealism

“…Such as a rejection of a sharp divide between descriptive and normative theory or of decontextualized theorizing (seePrinz and Rossi 2017); or of 'technocratic' ambitions to make policy guidance (seeRossi 2019). The latter criticism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the aims of pragmatic idealism.…”