Political Representation in Liquid Democracy

Abstract

This article provides an in-depth survey of political representation in Liquid Democracy (LD). More precisely, it refutes two potential criticisms: 1) LD impoverishes the concept of political representation relative to existing representative democracies; 2) LD undermines the centrality of political parties. In answer to (1), the article shows that LD is compatible with a selection model of representation, in which proxies are characterized as gyroscopic representatives, driven by intrinsic motivation and indifferent to sanctions. This claim has far-reaching normative implications for the mandate-independence tradeoff, anti-elitism, and deliberation under LD. With regard to (2), the article examines the function of parties, arguing that, although it puts parties and interest groups on a level playing field, LD does not threaten partisanship, but rather expands the range of potential carriers of partisanship. In addressing these objections, this article demonstrates the democratic credentials of LD, showing that LD is compatible with a high-quality, democratic understanding of representation, which is surrounded by a cluster of thick concepts like commitment, intrinsic motivation, alignment of objectives, sympathy, trust, and dialogue. This turns LD into a powerful instrument for the refurbishment of representation both as a unique mode of political participation and as a practice of self-government.

Clarifying and Defining the Concept of Liquid Democracy

“…The potential institutional changes are evident, even though it remains unclear how LD could effectively be integrated into existing democratic systems. The potential for theoretical-normative innovation is attested by recent research in political philosophy, which has scrutinized the extent to which LD can positively impact citizens' participation (Landemore, 2020), popular sovereignty (Lucardie & Vandamme, 2021), and political representation (Valsangiacomo, 2021). Injecting LD into existing democratic systems could help address various challenges and thus resettle the field of democracy studies.…”

“…It also fails to account for why some thinkers are envisaging broader applications of LD beyond the Pirates, and even beyond party politics. In fact, political theorists are starting to understand LD as a potential voting scheme for legislative policymaking (e.g., Blum & Zuber, 2016: 163; Landemore, 2020: 121; Valsangiacomo, 2021: 1). Moreover, LD could be—and already has been—applied within the private economy in order to enable new forms of workplace democracy that include employees and/or stakeholders in corporate decision‐making.…”

“…On the other hand, the flow of information concerning citizens’ preferences is also more granular (McCarthy, 2013), thanks to the free choice of the proximity basis, and it persists as long as the potential pool of proxies is kept as large as possible. Indeed, voluntary delegations make a voting system more “information bearing” (McCarthy, 2013: 3) and increase its descriptive power (Valsangiacomo, 2021: 3) or “content expressiveness” (Mendoza, 2015: 49).…”

“…By engaging in concept formation, it provides a first in‐depth conceptual analysis of LD that aims to clarify its meaning and foster a critical academic debate. In so doing, it follows up on the slow but significant increase in attention that LD has recently enjoyed in normative democratic theory (e.g., Blum & Zuber, 2016; Landemore, 2020; Lucardie & Vandamme, 2021; Valsangiacomo, 2021).…”

Liquid Democracy with Ranked Delegations

“…Introducing the option of delegating one's vote arguably lowers the bar for participation, as it does not require agents to get informed about an issue before making their vote count (Ford 2002;Boldi et al 2011;Valsangiacomo 2021). This is particularly true if delegations can be declared globally and/or for whole subject areas.…”