Political settlements and the analysis of institutions

Abstract

The political settlements framework argues that the distribution of organizational power is important for understanding the economic and political effects of institutions and policies. Institutions and policies describe rules that in turn determine resource allocation, and these can affect different types of organizations in very different ways. Organizations can be expected to support, resist or distort particular institutions or policies depending on their interests and capabilities. The distribution of organizational power can therefore determine the institutions and policies that are likely to persist as well as the ones most likely to be developmental in that context. This directs our attention to the importance of accurately identifying the relative power and capabilities of relevant organizations that describe a particular political settlement and how these may be changing over time. The articles in African Affairs that have used the political settlements framework demonstrate its usefulness. In this overview we examine the motivations behind the development of the framework and some of the challenges of applying it in the context of dynamic interactions between institutions and organizations. We also discuss the most appropriate definition of a political settlement, the questions the framework is most suited to answer and the challenges ahead for developing the framework and its applications.

Conceptualising the politics of social protection expansion in low income countries: The intersection of transnational ideas and domestic politics

“…An influential concept here is that of a ‘political settlement’, which ‘refers to the balance or distribution of power between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is based’ (Di John & Putzel, , p. 4). From this reading, institutions constitute not only the ‘rules of the game’ that influence individual behaviour, but also mechanisms for distributing rent within society (Khan, , p. 19). Where these institutions produce a distribution of rents that is not in line with the relative power of elite factions, institutions will be resisted through various strategies of negotiation and conflict until key interest groups settle upon a stable set of institutions that delivers an acceptable distribution of rents: a political settlement.…”

“…Political settlements analysts tend to treat ideas as a subordinate driver of political behaviour as compared with the incentives that flow from the political settlement and its resultant institutional arrangements. Ideas are considered merely as a tool used by elite factions to mobilise support as a means of achieving their pre‐defined interests (Khan, ). However, this approach offers a reductive reading of political behaviour (Hickey, ) and is unable to predict which policies (economic or social) will actually be selected by a particular coalition (Sen, ).…”

“…Ideas are considered merely as a tool used by elite factions to mobilise support as a means of achieving their pre-defined interests (Khan, 2010). However, this approach offers a reductive reading of political behaviour (Hickey, 2013) and is unable to predict which policies (economic or social) will actually be selected by a particular coalition (Sen, 2012).…”

Aid‐supported governance reforms in Solomon Islands: Piecemeal progress or persistent stalemate?

“…coercion by the state or sanctions by society). In addition to setting rules to structure social interaction, institutions support distributions of benefits that are consistent with the existing power relations in society, be they equal or unequal (Khan, 2010). In countries where formal institutions cannot generate and sustain benefits for different groups and classes in line with their relative power, informal institutions such as patron-client networks create supportive benefits (Khan, 2010).…”

“…In addition to setting rules to structure social interaction, institutions support distributions of benefits that are consistent with the existing power relations in society, be they equal or unequal (Khan, 2010). In countries where formal institutions cannot generate and sustain benefits for different groups and classes in line with their relative power, informal institutions such as patron-client networks create supportive benefits (Khan, 2010). While functioning as a mechanism of managing conflict through ensuring a minimum level of stability and growth required by all societies to operate (Khan, 2010), these patronage relationships, permeating the formal state structure, weaken state legitimacy (OECD, 2010) and may trigger violence (World Bank, 2011a) if members of a group believe their share of rents is lower than what others are receiving.…”