Political Values in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and Implications for Democracy

Abstract

Employing data from three surveys of mass opinion conducted in Lithuania, Ukraine and European Russia during 1990, 1991 and 1992, we examine three prominent but competing hypotheses about the source of political values in the post-Soviet societies: historically derived political culture, regime indoctrination and the effects of societal modernization. The literature on Soviet political culture argues that Russian mass values are distinguished by authoritarianism and love of order, values which will be largely shared by Ukrainians, especially East Ukrainians, whereas Lithuanian society would not evince this pattern. Our data do not support this hypothesis. We then examine acceptance of Soviet era norms, both political and economic. We do not find support for the argument that regime indoctrination during the Soviet period produced a set of ideologically derived values throughout the former Soviet Union and across a series of generations. The third hypothesis -that industrialization, urbanization, war and changing educational opportunities shaped the formative experiences of succeeding generations in the Soviet societies and, therefore, their citizens' values -receives the most support: in each of the three societies, differences in political values across age groups, places of residence and levels of education are noteworthy. The variations in political values we find across demographic groupings help us to understand the level of pro-democratic values in each society. We find that in Russia and Ukraine more support for democracy can be found among urban, better educated respondents than among other groups. In Lithuania, the urban and better educated respondents evince pro-democratic values at about the same level as their counterparts in Russia and Ukraine, but Lithuanian farmers and blue-collar workers support democracy at a level closer to urban, white-collar Lithuanians than to their Russian and Ukrainian counterparts. In all three societies, those citizens most likely to hold values supportive of democracy are those who are less favourable to Soviet-era values and less convinced of the primacy of the need for social and political 'order'. Those who desire strong leadership, however, tend to have more democratic values, not more authoritarian ones.Why do some societies have a pattern of mass political values that seems supportive of stable democracy while others do not?! The political transformations under way in the post-Soviet societies provide a rare laboratory for * Reisinger, Miller and Hesli are with the

Yaroslavl’ Revisited: Assessing Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture Since 1990

“…On the question of a strong leader, the data here confirm findings by other scholars (Reisinger, et al, 1994) that…”

“…My own findings (Hahn, 1991) based on research in Yaroslavl' in 1990 suggested that attitudes, values, and beliefs about democracy among Russians were not altogether different from what was found in other industrialised democracies, including the USA. Generally speaking, these findings were independently confirmed in a number of other studies (Gibson, et al, 1992;Reisinger et al, 1994;Gibson, 1996) based on survey research conducted in the early 1990s.…”

Sistemas de valores e atitudes democráticas de estudantes universitários

“…De fato, embora exista na literatura internacional um número razoável de escalas construídas para avaliar o posicionamento dos indivíduos em relação à democracia (Finkel & cols., 1999), os parâmetros psicométricos desses instrumentos são questionáveis. Nesse sentido, a maioria dos instrumentos sobre atitudes democráticas não apresenta indicadores de validade e fidedignidade, tais como a Escala de Princípios Fundamentais da Democracia (Prothro & Grigg, 1960), a Escala de Aplicação dos Princípios Democráticos (McClosky, 1964) e o Índice de Orientação Pró-Democracia (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1995;Reisinger, Miller, Hesli & Maher, 1994). Mesmo quando os instrumentos mostram algum grau de validade, não apresentam indicadores confiáveis de fidedignidade, como a Escala de Adesão à Democracia (Weil, 1989(Weil, , 1993), a escala de Atitudes em Frente à Democracia (Whitefield & Evans, 1996) e a escala de Adesão aos Princí-pios Democráticos (Kaase, 1971 (Gibson, Duch & Tedin, 1992).…”

Public Behavior and Political Change in Post-Soviet States

“…For virtually all ethnic Lithuanians in Lithuania, the resulting incorporation into the Soviet Union was illegitimate. When protest became possible in the late 1980s, citizens of the Baltic 7For an investigation of this question with regard to political values, see Reisinger et al (1994). republics, including Lithuania, were quicker to form into popular front organizations and push for an end to communist rule. Similar organizations emerged in Russia and Ukraine, but somewhat later and with less popular support.…”

“…That is, as Soviet citizens became politically socialized during this era, did virtually none of them gain the psychological disposition toward activity that should have been expected of a reasonable sized minority in an urbanized, industrial country such as the USSR? Or, alternatively, IODebates over the degree and direction of value change among Soviet citizens as well as over the reasons behind it continue (Bahry 1993;Gibson, Duch, and Tedin 1992;Hahn 1991;Reisinger et al 1994;Remington 1990). was the size of the segment psychologically disposed toward political activity roughly comparable to that found in other developed countries without that disposition translating into political behavior? Before Gorbachev coming to power in 1985, the Soviet regime was outwardly united in its opposition to public criticism of its policies and willing to repress those who publicly dissented.…”