Political Violence and War

Post-accord Crime and Violence

“…As society becomes accustomed to the widespread use of violence during a protracted civil war, violence becomes a legitimate and acceptable response to solving everyday conflicts. A culture of violence is thus both a consequence and a necessary condition of intrastate armed conflict 62 . This impact lingers on after the war: Civilians became desensitised to violence and, because norms and values are slow to change, this permissive context continue into the post-accord society.…”

Context-specificity of violence: Physical, psychological, and social dimensions of harm during the Taliban’s insurgency (2007–2009) in Pakistan

“…Every force is not violence in Dewey’s view, but it becomes violence when it is destructive (Bufacchi, 2005). As for Christina Steenkamp (2014), violence involves “the intentional use of physical force” and infliction of “injury or damage to a person or object” (p. 8).…”

Localized legacies of civil war

“…In addition to Bateson’s quantitative study, Nussio & Howe (2014) show how within-country variations in demobilization processes and the subsequent breakdown of what they call ‘wartime illegal protection systems’ in Columbia affected levels of postwar violence via three causal mechanisms: reduced costs to resort to crime, opportunities for revenge, and competition among criminal networks and remobilized armed groups. Evidence from cases such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Syria (Steenkamp, 2009, 2014) further shows that armed conflict can give rise to structures and cultures that facilitate the continuation of wartime violence and the emergence of new forms of violence in the postwar period. Focusing on institutional arrangements, Kurtenbach (2013) illustrates how patterns of war termination, policies aiming to mitigate the conflict’s root causes, and institutional reforms shape levels of homicide in Central America.…”

“…A key component of modern states is their claim on the monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force in order to protect their citizenry from internal and external threats (Tilly, 1990; Weber, 1958). States that experience civil wars, that is, political conflicts in which one or more non-state actors are challenging the state with violent means within its own territory, are not upholding their monopoly and providing security (Kalyvas, 2006: 18; Steenkamp, 2014: 56). When states do not perform these core functions, the population’s trust in them and perceptions of legitimacy are likely to be eroded (Hutchison and Johnson, 2011; Lake, 2010).…”

“…Former armed groups and dissident factions may use the situation to engage in violent scrambles for local power before the state is able to re-establish its monopoly and to govern efficiently (Boyle, 2014). Or, they may continue with criminal activities that were established during the war to widen control beyond political purposes, or to pursue individual agendas (Mac Ginty, 2006; Steenkamp, 2009, 2011, 2014). The transformation of former fighters and armed actors into crime groups is particularly likely, as these types of actors share common characteristics, such as the need to employ personnel specialized in the use of violence (Kalyvas, 2015).…”